From the category archives:

Print Issues

CAPACITY, CONFLICT, AND CHANGE: ELDER LAW AND ESTATE PLANNING THEMES IN AN AGING WORLD
Katherine C. Pearson

ABSTRACT

The 2012-13 Symposium Issue of the Penn State Law Review arose out of collaboration between two sections of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) for the Annual Meeting in January 2013. The leadership of the Section on Trusts and Estates and the Section on Aging and the Law called for a dialogue among law faculty members who teach, research and write in these and related fields, with a special eye to the demographics of population aging. This article introduces the themes heard in the conference and highlights key themes of the formal papers.

PDF FULL TEXT

preferred citation: Introduction to Symposium Issue, Capacity, Conflict, and Change: Elder Law and Estate Planning Themes in an Aging World, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 979 (2013).

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

TEACHING TRUSTS & ESTATES AND ELDER LAW: PEDAGOGY FOR THE FUTURE

Co-Moderators:
Susan E. Cancelosi, Wayne State University Law School
Nina A. Kohn, Syracuse University College of Law
Barry Kozak, The John Marshall Law School
William P. LaPiana, New York Law School

Panelists:
Lenore S. Davis, Law Offices of Lenore S. Davis, New York, NY
Lawrence A. Frolik, University of Pittsburgh School of Law
Richard L. Kaplan, University of Illinois College of Law
Katherine C. Pearson, Penn State Dickinson School of Law
Michael L. Perlin, New York Law School
Mary Radford, Georgia State University College of Law
Robert Whitman, University of Connecticut School of Law

ABSTRACT

This is an edited transcript of a presentation given in New Orleans on January 5, 2013, as part of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Aging and the Law and Trusts and Estates Joint Program.

The first set of panelists began with pedagogical concerns, including the need to explore more deeply with students the capacity issues, often subtle or variable, that can be inherent in drafting and executing planning documents, such as wills, trusts, and powers of attorney. During this first session, recently retired New York County Surrogate Court Judge Kristin Booth Glen—now Dean Emerita at City University of New York School of Law—offered her real world observation that guardianships for incapacitated elders are frequently used to accomplish “pre-mortem planning” by aspiring transferees of the disabled ward, a disturbing development worthy of future research.

Without abandoning the pedagogical theme, the second set of speakers examined the potential for conflicts of interest that occur when working across generational lines, or with older adults or disabled persons.  These “conflicts” can occur in several ways, including the potential for conflict between joint account holders, fiduciaries and beneficiaries, and lawyers and clients.  University of Illinois Law Professor Richard Kaplan provided practice-based exercises for the classroom in the form of two planning scenarios that pose the potential for conflicts of interest, which are captured as appendices in the transcript.  A sobering additional observation about the “surge in intra-family conflict/abuse cases” was offered by Lenore Davis, Esq., from her perspective as a private attorney with an estate practice in New York and New Jersey, thus emphasizing the conflict potential among family members struggling to make sense of their care-giving and care-receiving roles.

Finally, in the third segment, University of Pittsburgh Law Professor Lawrence Frolik focused on the use of “trust protector clauses,” language that anticipates the possibility of concerns about capacity, conflict, and change in estate planning documents.  Professor Frolik also cautioned wisely that, in elder law, we may have to “pull back” from what was once a dominant focus on Medicaid planning and instead concentrate on the larger issues of protection, including the best interests of the older adult.

PDF FULL TEXT

preferred citation: Susan E. Cancelosi et al., Teaching Trusts & Estates and Elder Law: Pedagogy for the Future, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 987 (2013).

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

UNDERSTANDING DUTIES AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST—A GUIDE FOR THE HONORABLE AGENT
Linda S. Whitton

ABSTRACT

This article examines the importance of understanding agent duties and conflicts of interest, both for drafting a power of attorney that meets a principal’s objectives and for providing guidance to the agent who will act under its authority.  Professor Whitton suggests that current custom and practice with respect to powers of attorney often overlooks the need to adjust agent duties to accommodate the principal’s expectations, thus resulting in inadvertent conflicts between the duty to do what the principal expects and default duties of loyalty.  The article offers practical guidelines for identifying and reconciling these conflicts, as well as best practices to improve the agent’s understanding of the authority granted in the power of attorney, the principal’s expectations for exercise of that authority, and the duties an agent must meet when carrying out the principal’s expectations.

PDF FULL TEXT

preferred citation: Linda S. Whitton, Understanding Duties and Conflicts of Interest—A Guide for the Honorable Agent, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 1037 (2013).

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

CAPACITY FOR LIFETIME AND ESTATE PLANNING
Robert Whitman

ABSTRACT

Clients consulting with elder and estate planning attorneys for estate planning documents will likely receive a “package” of five documents:  a will, a trust (revocable or irrevocable), a health care power, a durable power of attorney, and a living will.  Although capacity standards have varied for each of the items in the “package,” an informal survey of American College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC) members reveals that practitioners do not pay attention to these distinctions when they create the “package.”  Practitioners are either unwilling to accept the engagement for lack of competence or willing to overlook the capacity distinctions when accepting the engagement.  This article thus advocates for a uniform test for capacity when an attorney considers preparing the “package” for a client.

PDF FULL TEXT

preferred citation: Robert Whitman, Capacity for Lifetime and Estate Planning, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 1061 (2013).

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

SLOW LAWYERING: REPRESENTING SENIORS IN LIGHT OF COGNITIVE CHANGES ACCOMPANYING AGING
Mary Helen McNeal

ABSTRACT

As an increasing number of lawyers represent clients who are elderly, it is imperative that lawyers become more knowledgeable about the aging process and how it impacts our clients.  Although it is difficult to generalize, many seniors experience numerous and diverse cognitive changes that accompany the aging process.  Existing literature offers various frameworks for addressing capacity issues and techniques for assessing diminished capacity.  However, current legal scholarship provides little guidance for lawyers on how to accommodate these changes when they do not rise to the level of diminished capacity or dementia, and when the changes may, in fact, result in increased wisdom and “developmental intelligence.”  This article seeks to fill that void.  It summarizes selected cognitive developments that impact memory, outlining various types of memory and how they evolve during the aging process.  This article also discusses current literature on decision-making capacity and different decision-making models and strategies that seniors may rely upon.  The article concludes with recommendations on methods for enhancing communications with aging clients, while simultaneously acknowledging and accommodating cognitive changes and enabling seniors to play a prominent role in the representational process.

PDF FULL TEXT

preferred citation: Mary Helen McNeal, Slow Lawyering: Representing Seniors in Light of Cognitive Changes Accompanying Aging, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 1081 (2013).

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING: A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO GUARDIANSHIP?
Nina A. Kohn, Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Amy T. Campbell

ABSTRACT

The law has traditionally responded to cognitive disability by authorizing surrogate decision-makers to make decisions on behalf of disabled individuals.  However, supported decision-making, an alternative paradigm for addressing cognitive disability, is rapidly gaining political support.  According to its proponents, supported decision-making empowers individuals with cognitive challenges by ensuring that they are the ultimate decision-maker but are provided support from one or more others, giving them the assistance they need to make decisions for themselves.  This article describes supported decision-making and its normative appeal.  It then provides a descriptive account of how supported decision-making works based on the empirical literature on supported decision-making as well as that on shared decision-making, a related model used in medical contexts.  The article shows how employing supported decision-making in lieu of guardianship, or integrating it into the guardianship system, has the potential to promote the self-determination of persons with intellectual and cognitive disabilities consistent with international and national legal norms.  However, we find that, despite much rhetoric touting its advantages, little is known about how supported decision-making processes operate or about the outcomes of those processes.  Further research is necessary to design and develop effective supported decision-making systems.  We therefore propose a series of research questions to help inform policy choices surrounding supported decision-making.

PDF FULL TEXT

preferred citation: Nina A. Kohn, Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Amy T. Campbell, Supported Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship?, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 1111 (2013).

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

“STRIKING FOR THE GUARDIANS AND PROTECTORS OF THE MIND”: THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE FUTURE OF GUARDIANSHIP LAW
Michael Perlin

ABSTRACT

In many nations, entry of a guardianship order becomes the “civil death” of the person affected because persons subjected to such measure are not only fully stripped of their legal capacity in all matters related to their finance and property but are also deprived of many other fundamental rights, including the right to vote, the right to consent or refuse medical treatment (including forced psychiatric treatment), freedom of association, and the right to marry and have a family.  The United Nations’ ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) radically changes the scope of international human rights law as it applies to all persons with disabilities, and in no area is this more significant than in the mental disability law context.  And there is no question that the CRPD speaks to the issue of guardianship.  This article examines what impact, if any, the CRPD and other international human rights documents will have on guardianship practice around the world.  This question is of great importance given the common usage of this status and the lack of procedural safeguards that attend the application of this status in many nations.

This article begins by examining why guardianship is considered “civil death” in much of the world before discussing the possible impact that the CRPD will have on the application of guardianship laws.  Issues discussed include the need for some mechanism to insure the appointment of counsel to persons facing guardianship; the need for a mechanism to insure that, in those cases in which guardianship is inevitably necessary, “personal” guardians will be appointed instead of institutional ones; the need for domestic courts—in all parts of the world—to take these issues seriously when they are litigated on a case-by-case basis; and the inevitable problems that will arise in the Asia and Pacific region, where there is no regional court or commission at which litigants can seek CRPD enforcement.  Finally, this article considers the impact of therapeutic jurisprudence on the questions at hand, and concludes by looking again at the CRPD as a potentially emancipatory means of restructuring guardianship law around the world.

PDF FULL TEXT

preferred citation: Michael Perlin, “Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind”: The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Future of Guardianship Law, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 1159 (2013).

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

“ELDER LAW” AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
James H. Pietsch & Margaret Hall

ABSTRACT

This article considers the problem of conflicts of interest in elder law in the context of a larger discussion about elder law as a bounded legal subject.  The problem of conflicts of interest is not particular to elder law.  Conflicts, intentional and unintentional, have a special salience in this context, however.  That salience is intensified by the expanded scope of “elder law” to include other classes of vulnerable clients, such as persons with disabilities.  Despite the significance of conflicts as a real, perceived, or potential issue in this context, the issue has received relatively scant attention and discussion.  This inattention to conflicts has distorted perceptions of elder law within the wider legal community, with unfortunate consequences for the development of elder law as a discrete field of practice and research.  This article considers the issue of conflicts in the elder law discourse from both an American and Canadian perspective.  Core practice areas for American elder law (areas not readily transportable to non-American jurisdictions) are areas in which the conflicts issue is especially prominent.  From an international perspective, a perception may be created of elder law as a peculiarly American practice area, and one which is rife with real and potential conflicts that elder law practitioners—and those who would export the model—may prefer to ignore.  This dynamic has frustrated the development of elder law as an international, multi-faceted, and interdisciplinary area of law.  Confronting the issue of conflicts in elder law is an important first step in continuing the coherent development of elder law (perhaps within a rubric of law, policy and aging) as a bounded legal subject.

PDF FULL TEXT

preferred citation: James H. Pietsch & Margaret Hall,Elder Law” and Conflicts of Interest in the United States and Canada, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 1191 (2013).

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

WHY MARRIAGE IS STILL THE BEST DEFAULT IN ESTATE PLANNING CONFLICTS
Lynne Marie Kohm

ABSTRACT

By analyzing a Tennessee bigamy case, a New York same-sex marriage case, and the growing cultural trend toward cohabitation over marriage, this article discusses how and why marriage is the best estate plan to protect vulnerable parties as they age.  The article examines how marriage assists vulnerable parties in avoiding potential conflicts in estate planning and distribution, particularly when those parties have entered into alternative relationships.  By focusing on the cases of Witherspoon, in which John Witherspoon entered into a bigamous second marriage, and Windsor, in which Edie Windsor is suing the U.S. government over the lack of federal tax recognition afforded her Canadian same-sex marriage, this article reveals how marriage expansion does not necessarily incentivize marriage, nor does it provide the benefits and protections often sought by those who enter into those marriage-like relationships.

By contrasting the protection marriage affords to a vulnerable party in estate distribution and the dilemmas presented by marriage expansion (as illustrated in Witherspoon and Windsor) with the cultural disquiet over the importance of the nature and meaning of marriage, this article illuminates estate distribution conflicts in the context of the paradox of contemporary American socio-legal marriage culture.  Despite the pop culture confusion over marriage, this article demonstrates why it is still the best default for estate planning conflicts.

PDF FULL TEXT

preferred citation: Lynne Marie Kohm, Why Marriage is Still the Best Default in Estate Planning Conflicts, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 1219 (2013).

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

SOCIAL SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE MISUSE
Reid K. Weisbord

ABSTRACT

This Article examines the problem of benefit misuse within the Social Security representative payee system, identifies shortcomings in the current legal framework for policing the payee’s conduct, and proposes legislative reform.  The Social Security “representative payee” system serves an important function by protecting beneficiaries who have cognitive impairments and therefore cannot manage their own financial affairs.  For beneficiaries living in an institutional setting, such as a nursing or group home, however, the appointment of the home or home administrator as representative payee creates conflicts of interest that adversely affect the beneficiary.  Benefit misuse by representative payees in this setting tends to go undetected because the Social Security Administration lacks resources to perform universal audits and the cognitively compromised beneficiary is often incapable of detecting financial improprieties. To improve oversight of institutional representative payees such as nursing and group homes, this Article proposes that Congress create a “family representative” program wherein a concerned relative or friend would be authorized to monitor the payee without assuming the burdens and liabilities of a representative payee appointment.  The family representative would be a person familiar with the beneficiary’s needs and circumstances and would receive a copy of all reports submitted by the representative payee to the Social Security Administration.  The family representative’s access to information regarding the payee’s performance would facilitate greater detection and reporting of benefit misuse to the Social Security Administration than under the current system.  The Article’s Appendix contains legislative language for a proposed statutory amendment to the Social Security Act that would implement the family representative program.

PDF FULL TEXT

preferred citation: Reid K. Weisbord, Social Security Representative Payee Misuse, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 1257 (2013).

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MEDICINE, RESEARCH, AND LAW: A COMPARISON
Stacey Tovino

ABSTRACT

Several of the remarks and articles presented in this symposium have addressed conflicts of interest arising during the provision of legal counsel to individuals who are elderly, including specific conflicts of interest implicated by estate planning, retirement planning, and long-term care planning.  Topics examined thus far include conflicts of interest with respect to the application of rules of confidentiality within state rules of professional conduct to elderly clients with impaired decision-making capacity; conflicts of interest involving representative payees for Social Security benefits; conflicts of interest in distributions when parents enter into marriages that are unprotected by law; and conflicts of interest inherent in powers of attorney, among others.

This article will diverge slightly from the prior articles and focus instead on conflicts of interest present in the involvement of individuals who are elderly with impaired decision-making capacity in clinical and experimental medicine when legal counsel and advanced health care and research participation planning have not taken place.  More specifically, Parts I and II of this article will identify conflicts of interest that arise in the contexts of clinical medicine and human subjects research when an elderly patient with impaired decision-making capacity has not executed an advanced health care directive, an advanced biomedical or behavioral research directive, or other similar document, and for whom a guardian has not been appointed.  Parts I and II also compare and contrast illustrative state approaches for identifying and managing these conflicts to determine whether one state’s approach to managing such conflicts is preferable to another.

Part III of this article compares and contrasts approaches taken by illustrative state rules of professional conduct for managing conflicts of interest in the context of legal representation.  Part IV compares the approaches used in legal representation to the approaches used in clinical medicine and human subjects research.  One purpose of these comparisons is to identify options for managing conflicts in different professional settings and to determine whether the approach of one professional setting is superior to another.  Part IV finds that the law imposes more stringent duties on attorneys regarding the identification and management of conflicts of interest with respect to their clients as opposed to physicians with respect to their patients and researchers with respect to their human subjects.  Part IV also finds that the conflicts of interest that can arise due to the lack of advanced health care and research participation planning are as substantively concerning, if not more so, than the conflicts of interest that arise during the provision of estate planning, retirement planning, and long-term care planning.

For these reasons, this article joins the already robust law review and other literatures that urge advanced health care and advanced research participation planning to minimize conflicts of interest that could arise when a surrogate, in the absence of a formally appointed agent or guardian, would like to consent to the administration, withholding, or withdrawal of treatment or consent to research participation on behalf of an elderly individual with impaired decision-making capacity.  As such, this article hopefully serves as a nice capstone to the other pieces in this symposium by providing yet another reminder that legal planning, even with the conflicts of interest identified by the other authors in this symposium, is almost always superior to the lack of planning.  This article also, however, proposes a novel solution for health care and research-related conflicts:  state laws governing conflicts of interest in clinical medicine and human subject research should consider borrowing approaches to conflicts management that are set forth in state rules of attorney professional conduct.

PDF FULL TEXT

preferred citation: Stacey Tovino, Conflicts of Interest in Medicine, Research, and Law: A Comparison, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 1291 (2013).

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

LOUIS F. DEL DUCA, EDWARD N. POLISHER DISTINGUISHED FACULTY SCHOLAR
Mark Podvia

ABSTRACT

As we prepare to finalize this Symposium Issue, another milestone is reached at Penn State Dickinson School of Law.  Professor Louis Del Duca, who for more than 50 years has graced our classrooms and inspired faculty colleagues to pursue satisfying lives as internationally aware scholars, is retiring from full-time teaching.  We are happy to report that Professor Del Duca has no need for a law review issue so comprehensively concerned with diminishing capacity.  It is with sincere affection and respect that everyone at Penn State Dickinson School of Law wishes him well.  Law Librarian and Legal Research Professor Mark Podvia has drawn upon his skills and creativity as a legal historian to compose a colorful tribute to Professor Del Duca.

PDF FULL TEXT

preferred citation: Mark Podvia, Dedication, Louis F. Del Duca, Edward N. Polisher Distinguished Faculty Scholar, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 1337 (2013).

 

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

NEGOTIATING ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES – A FOLLOW-UP
Richard E. Climan, Panel Chair & Moderator; George R. Bason, Jr., Counsel for the Target CompanyJoel I. Greenberg, Counsel for the Buyer; and Lisa A. Schmidt, Delaware Counsel

ABSTRACT

This is an edited transcript of a presentation given in New York City in September 2012 on the topic of negotiating acquisitions of publicly traded companies.  The presentation was intended to serve as a supplement and update to an earlier presentation on the same topic, given in late 2011.  An edited transcript of that earlier presentation appears at 116 Penn St. L. Rev. 615 (2012) and readers would be well served by reading the two edited transcripts together.

Among the subtopics addressed in the accompanying edited transcript are:

  • Negotiating “use” restrictions, disclosure restrictions, and liability disclaimers in confidentiality agreements after the Vulcan and RAA decisions;
  • Negotiating standstill provisions and “don’t-ask-don’t-waive” provisions;
  • The SEC Staff’s clarified stance on the viability of “dual track” structures in leveraged acquisitions;
  • Negotiating “walk rights” in public company acquisitions; and
  • Negotiating board recommendation covenants (a form of deal protection in public company acquisitions).

PDF FULL TEXT

preferred citation:  Richard E. Climan et al., Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies—A Follow-Up, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 647 (2013).

 

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

DOES LIVING BY THE SWORD MEAN DYING BY THE SWORD?
Charles Chernor Jalloh

ABSTRACT

This article examines the right to self-representation in international criminal law, and the common challenges posed for judges effectuating that right in international criminal courts.  Using a comparative law approach, the paper demonstrates how the interpretation of that right initially borrowed heavily from U.S. common law and later European civil law to address the problems caused by self-representing, disruptive, and uncooperative defendants.  Although the right to self-representation is a Sixth Amendment right in U.S. law, and an equally fundamental one in international law, the author contends that this right seems better in theory than in practice.  Indeed, since no self-representing defendant in an international penal court has ever succeeded in securing an acquittal, by choosing to represent themselves, defendants who lack the ability, objectivity, and experience needed to raise reasonable doubt in complex criminal trials may unwittingly help pave the prosecution’s way to their own convictions.

PDF FULL TEXT

preferred citation: Charles Chernor Jalloh, Does Living by the Sword Mean Dying by the Sword?, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 707 (2013).

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

THE RIGHT TO BEAR (ROBOTIC) ARMS
Dan Terzian

ABSTRACT

Can robotic weapons be “Arms” under the Second Amendment?  This article argues that they can.  In particular, it challenges the claim that the Second Amendment protects only weapons that can be carried in one’s hands, which has roots in both Supreme Court Second Amendment doctrine, namely District of Columbia v. Heller, and scholarship.  Scrutinizing these roots shows that Heller did not create such a requirement and that little, if any, constitutional basis for it exists.

This article also contextualizes robotic weapons within the established Second Amendment framework for arms.  Robotic weapons are not yet arms, but there is no legal impediment—nor should there be—to them becoming arms.

Finally, this article presents an alternative theory of Second Amendment protection for robotic weapons based on auxiliary rights, in light of the Seventh Circuit case United States v. Ezell.  This article posits that Second Amendment auxiliary rights include the right to employ a bodyguard, whether human or robot.

PDF FULL TEXT

preferred citation:: Dan Terzian, The Right to Bear (Robotic) Arms, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 755 (2013).

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

THE FLAWED U.S. APPROACH TO RULE OF LAW DEVELOPMENT
Cynthia Alkon

ABSTRACT

The key flaw to the United States’ approach to rule of law development is routinely including the “standard menu” of rule of law development assistance as a part of the overall development effort without regard to whether the recipient country is at a developmental stage where it is able to absorb some or all of this type of aid.  This article uses Afghanistan as a case study.  Despite a decade of assistance, Afghanistan remains a fragile and conflict-affected country, thus raising concerns about the value of the aid given and whether rule of law development aid should continue to be a part of the standard aid package in similarly situated countries.  This article also reports the results of a small-scale survey of rule of law development workers in Afghanistan who were universally critical of rule of law development efforts in Afghanistan.

This article concludes that the experience in Afghanistan demonstrates the need to change how the United States approaches rule of law development assistance.  The United States should no longer routinely include rule of law development assistance in developmental aid packages.  Instead, the United States should analyze the current conditions in a particular country and determine whether that country is ready for rule of law development assistance.  This analysis should consider economic, political, and social development, and whether the country is currently in armed conflict.  Depending on the level of development, it might make better sense for limited rule of law assistance.  In some countries, it might be better to provide no rule of law assistance and instead to focus on other development goals and advocate for rule of law development at a political level.

PDF FULL TEXT

preferred citation:  Cynthia Alkon, The Flawed U.S. Approach to Rule of Law Development, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 797 (2013).

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

STUDENT CHALLENGES TO ACADEMIC DECISIONS: THE NEED FOR THE JUDICIARY TO LOOK BEYOND DEFERENCE
Jessica Barlow

ABSTRACT

U.S. courts have consistently held that college students may not sue their institutions based on academic challenges.  Academic challenges, to be distinguished from disciplinary issues, are those that involve a student’s course work and acceptance into special academic programs.  Due to the judiciary’s categorization of academic challenges as not cognizable claims, students do not have a neutral third-party forum where their rights can be adequately evaluated.  Although courts have stated that the judiciary is not the appropriate forum for academic claims due to lack of expertise, among other issues, this Comment argues that courts are an appropriate forum for the adjudication of certain academic challenges.  This Comment further argues that there is strong support for judicial review of cases in the areas of contract formation, breach of contract, tort law, and personal liberties.  Finally, this Comment presents a series of questions that courts may ask when choosing whether to adjudicate a student’s legal claim against their institution.

PDF FULL TEXT

preferred citation:  Jessica Barlow, Student Challenges to Academic Decisions: The Need for the Judiciary to Look Beyond Deference, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 873 (2013).

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

LEAVING NO VETERAN BEHIND: POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES ON COMBAT TRAUMA, VETERANS COURTS, AND THE REHABILITATIVE APPROACH TO CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
Mark McCormick-Goodhart

ABSTRACT

As of June 2012, at least 104 jurisdictions spanning 28 states have created specialized criminal courts for veterans.  Known as Veterans Treatment Courts (VTCs), these courts focus on rehabilitation, rather than incarceration, to address the root causes of criminal behavior.  Although other articles have described the emergence of VTCs, few, if any, have focused on the jurisdictional differences between them.  This Comment addresses the basic treatment process and jurisdictional differences among VTCs in the United States, with a particular focus on VTCs in Pennsylvania.  This Comment also discusses trends in the VTC movement, the effectiveness of VTCs to date, perspectives from both critics and advocates, and the need for greater awareness efforts regarding the unique purposes of these courts.

PDF FULL TEXT

preferred citation: Mark McCormick-Goodhart, Leaving No Veteran Behind: Policies and Perspectives on Combat Trauma, Veterans Courts, and the Rehabilitative Approach to Criminal Behavior, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 895 (2013).

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

TRADING SEX FOR COLLEGE TUITION: HOW SUGAR DADDY “DATING” SITES MAY BE SUGAR COATING PROSTITUTION
Jacqueline Motyl

ABSTRACT

Recently, the amount of outstanding student loan debt has skyrocketed, forcing young college students to seek nontraditional sources of financial support.  Some of these individuals have turned to sugar daddy dating sites that specialize in pairing young, attractive sugar babies with older, wealthy sugar daddies in “arrangements.”  An arrangement is distinct from a traditional relationship because sugar babies receive an allowance from their sugar daddies in exchange for sex and companionship.  The media has declared that arrangements are merely prostitution in disguise and that sugar daddy dating sites facilitate prostitution online.  This Comment analyzes the liability of sugar daddies and babies under the Model Penal Code’s definition of prostitution.  Additionally, this Comment discusses sugar daddy dating sites’ potential liability for facilitating prostitution in view of the broad immunity offered to websites for user-content under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.  This Comment concludes by positing that current civil and criminal laws are insufficient to ensure that prostitution is not taking place within sugar arrangements and suggests that law enforcement infiltrate sugar daddy dating sites to guard against online prostitution.

PDF FULL TEXT

preferred citation:  Jacqueline Motyl, Trading Sex for College Tuition: How Sugar Daddy “Dating” Sites May Be Sugar Coating Prostitution, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 927 (2013).

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

ABORTIONS IN IRELAND: RECONCILING A HISTORY OF RESTRICTIVE ABORTION PRACTICES WITH THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ RULING IN A., B. & C. v. IRELAND
Morgan Rhinehart

ABSTRACT

For most women seeking to end a pregnancy in Ireland, abortion in the country is illegal and difficult to obtain.  The law, at least in theory, allows women the right to an abortion only when there is a serious risk to the mother’s life.  Because Ireland has some of the strictest laws in the world regarding abortion, thousands of Irish women are forced to travel to other countries to end their pregnancies.

Throughout Ireland’s history, pro-life advocates have experienced little to no influential opposition from their pro-choice counterparts.  However, in 2005, three women sued Ireland in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) after they could not obtain abortions in Ireland and subsequently traveled abroad for this purpose.  In A., B. & C. v. Ireland, the ECHR found that Ireland violated Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention because the country failed to establish a set of effective and accessible procedures for women and their doctors to determine if the women qualified for a legal abortion.

This Comment will focus on the history of Irish abortion law and the potential effect of the A., B. & C. v. Ireland ruling.  The Comment will then analyze the changes that Ireland has made since the ECHR ruling and will evaluate whether the Irish government is committed to bringing the country’s laws in line with the ECHR requirements.  Finally, this Comment will conclude that, based on Ireland’s history regarding abortion and its actions since the ECHR ruling, the Irish Government will likely take an “action-on-paper” approach that implements the ECHR ruling in theory but not in practice.

 PDF FULL TEXT

preferred citation:  Morgan Rhinehart, Abortions in Ireland: Reconciling a History of Restrictive Abortion Practices with the European Court of Human Rights’ Ruling in A., B. & C. v. Ireland, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 959 (2013).

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

GUANTANAMO BAY AND THE CONFLICT OF ETHICAL LAWYERING
Dana Carver Boehm


ABSTRACT

The Guantanamo Bay military commissions have been the subject of intense national and international debate since they were announced months after the September 11th attacks.  This important debate largely has focused on the perennial tension between liberty and security on the one hand and the somewhat technical legal questions regarding the constitutionality of prescribed procedures on the other.  As significant as these issues are, the discussion generally has ignored an element of the military commissions that profoundly shapes how national security, civil liberties, and the experience of criminal justice actually occurs:  the way that lawyers charged with prosecuting and defending these cases pursue their professional duties as lawyers.

This Article considers the unique institutional identities, organizational context, ethical obligations, and professional incentives of the commissions’ military lawyers, analyzing how they shape and are shaped by participation in the Guantanamo Bay military commission system.  This analysis is important not just as a framework for understanding the troubled history of the commissions, nor only as an interesting case study of organizational dynamics and identity theory.  Rather, a close look at the institutional identities, ethical obligations, and professional incentives of the military commission lawyers reveals that the military commission system is in desperate need of reform not simply on the basis of constitutional concerns, but on the basis of legal ethics.

This Article argues that the institutional identity of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps (JAG) lawyers who operate the military commission system influences these lawyers’ response to the challenging ethical issues and professional pressures inherent in military commission terrorist prosecution.  This analysis—based in part on interviews with JAG and civilian prosecutors and defense attorneys—documents a problem not yet addressed in the scholarly discussions of military commissions:  that the commissions are structured such that JAG lawyers, a group institutionally identified with the highest standards of ethical conduct, are effectively discouraged from adhering to those standards.  Although the courts-martial system in which these lawyers generally operate is not without its own ethical pressures, the unique dynamic present within the commission system effectively discourages the type of ethical conduct these lawyers have traditionally viewed as their highest priority, including zealous representation of clients and the impartial administration of justice.  This Article documents the pressures faced by the commission lawyers and their causes, foremost among which is the highly politicized nature of the commission system.  Recognizing and understanding how these often subtle pressures affect the military commission system is important because, taken cumulatively, these pressures increase the likelihood of conviction in ways that procedural reforms at the focus of academic, congressional, and executive debates have not addressed.

PDF View PDF  

 

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

SHADOW CITIZENS:  FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DEBT
Ann Cammett

ABSTRACT

The disenfranchisement of felons has long been challenged as anti-democratic and disproportionately harmful to communities of color.  Critiques of this practice have led to the gradual liberalization of state laws that expand voting rights for those who have served their sentences.  Despite these legal developments, ex-felons face an increasingly difficult path to regaining the franchise.  This article argues that, for ex-felons in particular, criminal justice debt can serve as an insurmountable obstacle to the resumption of voting rights and broader participation in society.  This article uses the term “carceral debt” to identify criminal justice penalties levied on prisoners, “user fees” assessed to recoup the operating costs of the justice system, and debt incurred during incarceration, including mounting child support obligations.

In recent years, another disturbing voting rights challenge has emerged that has received little attention from scholars.  State appellate and federal courts across the country have affirmed the constitutionality of statutes that require ex-felons to satisfy the payment of all carceral debts in order to resume voting privileges.  Such a paradigm has a clearly differential impact on the poor:  if only those who can pay their debts after a criminal conviction can regain the right to vote, those who cannot will remain perpetually disenfranchised, rendering them “shadow citizens” and raising a host of policy and constitutional questions.

PDF View PDF  

 

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

VERIFY, THEN TRUST: HOW TO LEGALIZE OFF-LABEL DRUG MARKETING
Fazal Khan, M.D., J.D. & Justin Holloway, J.D.

ABSTRACT

…..

PDF View PDF 

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

THE MISSING “P”:  PROSECUTION, PREVENTION, PROTECTION, AND PARTNERSHIP IN THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT
Jennifer A.L. Sheldon-Sherman

ABSTRACT

Scholars estimate that at the height of the slave trade, 20,000 Africans were transported from their homes and enslaved in the United States. Today, involuntary servitude continues, with estimates that over 800,000 individuals, primarily women and children, are trafficked for sexual exploitation or labor each year. The Department of Justice estimates that between 18,000 and 20,000 individuals, immigrants as well as United States citizens, are trafficked each year in the United States alone. Trafficking exists in over 150 countries around the world and is documented in all fifty states.

One approach the United States has used to deter trafficking, punish offenders, and protect victims is the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”). Passed by Congress and signed into law by President Clinton in 2000,  the TVPA’s anti-trafficking stratgey has three primary purposes, commonly referred to as the “three P’s”: to punish traffickers; to support countries in preventing trafficking; and to provide restorative services to victims of trafficking. Despite its stated mission, there is still a disconnect between the three goals of the TVPA and a conflict between policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) as they attempt to provide services to victims and prioritize these goals.

In this Article, I focus on the missing “P” in the “three P” paradigm— partnership—by discussing the theoretical and practical benefits of law enforcement and NGO collaboration in working within the confines of the TVPA to provide the most deterrence to traffickers and the most relief to victims.  The Article specifically analyzes Department of Justice (“DOJ”) funded task forces and their success in partnering law enforcement with victim service providers to unite the goals of the TVPA.  It ends by examining the potential struggles task forces face and proposing means for extending and enhancing current success. Ultimately, the Article argues that understanding these partnerships, critiquing them, and enhancing their effectiveness is central to ensuring that the goals of the TVPA are finally met. This article is a call to local and federal law enforcement and victim service providers to recognize and openly acknowledge how each can assist the other in obtaining the three goals of the TVPA.

PDF View PDF 

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK:  HOW FEDERAL COURTS TOOK THE “FAIR” OUT OF THE FAIR SENTENCING ACT OF 2010
Sarah Hyser

ABSTRACT

Congress mandates stricter sentences on crack cocaine offenders than on powder cocaine offenders, despite the two substances being chemically identical.  Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (“1986 Act”), first-time possession of a small amount of crack yielded a mandatory minimum sentence of five years in prison.  Meanwhile, the same offender found guilty of possessing powder cocaine must possess 100 times that amount to receive the same five-year sentence.  This scheme was known as the 100:1 sentencing ratio.  The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA), signed by President Barack Obama on August 3, 2010, corrects this disparity by reducing—but not eliminating—the ratio between the two categories of drug offenders.  Due to vague legislative drafting and crafty judicial decision-making, Congress’s actions nearly failed to have their intended impact.  Because the FSA does not contain an express provision repealing the 1986 Act, some courts continued to apply pre-FSA sentences to defendants whose cases were pending when the FSA became law.  Because federal drug crimes carry a five-year statute of limitations, the number of affected defendants continued to grow as the window for indicting offenders on pre-FSA conduct remained open.  While this window was open, defendants were receiving sentences that Congress explicitly condemned and urgently repealed.  This tension resulted in a split among the U.S. Courts of Appeals and a subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Dorsey v. United States, which held that the FSA must be applied in pending cases.

This Comment sets forth the major arguments why, based on the purpose and legislative history of the FSA, the statute must be applied to all defendants sentenced after its passage.  Specifically, this Comment examines the background of the 100:1 sentencing ratio and the defunct rationale behind its enactment.  It then discusses the reversal of public opinion on the comparative dangerousness of crack cocaine and efforts to reform the sentencing disparity.  It details the FSA’s legislative history and reviews both the circuit split among the courts of appeals and the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Dorsey.  Finally, this Comment discusses questions left unanswered by the Court and areas of the law needing further reform.

 

PDF View PDF 

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

A SCIENCE-BASED ENDEAVOR:  INTERPRETING CONTAMINATION PREVENTION IN THE FOOD SAFETY MODERNIZATION ACT
Shauna Manion

ABSTRACT

…..

PDF View PDF  

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF REFORM:  STRENGTHENING OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS TO ACHIEVE
TITLE IX’S OBJECTIVES
Alison Renfrew  

ABSTRACT

Enacted forty years ago, Title IX was groundbreaking legislation designed to give women equal access and opportunities in athletics and academia.  The success of Title IX is dependent on the Office for Civil Rights, the federal agency responsible for administering and enforcing Title IX.  The Office of Civil Rights’ ability to adequately administer and enforce Title IX has been plagued by several problems.   As such, Title IX’s inherent promise of equality for women seems largely unfulfilled.

This Comment provides an overview of Title IX by exploring the legislative history, as well as its purposes and objectives.  In addition, this Comment examines the problems with the administrative and enforcement process used by the Office for Civil Rights for Title IX violations.  Finally, this Comment offers several reforms that could be made by the Office for Civil Rights to improve and strengthen Title IX.    

PDF View PDF 

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

A HOLEY CAUSE:  SHARIA AS A CULTURAL DEFENSE
Raman Singh

ABSTRACT

States have the power to ban cultural defenses under the police powers doctrine.  However, any attempt to ban the use of Sharia as a cultural defense presents a serious problem.  Because Sharia is a religious doctrine, any statute regulating Sharia must survive scrutiny under the religion clauses of the First Amendment.  As a result of Supreme Court precedent, states are only permitted to ban the use of Sharia as a cultural defense if the statute is neutral and of general applicability.  This Comment analyzes Awad v. Ziriax, in which the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma struck down an amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution barring the use of Sharia in courtrooms.  This Comment then proposes a statutory solution that would survive First Amendment scrutiny, allowing states to ban Sharia as a defense to criminal offenses.

PDF View PDF  

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

ABOLISHING THE SHELTER OF AMBIGUITY:  A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR TREASURY REGULATION DEFERENCE CLARIFYING CHEVRON AND BRAND X
Sebastian Watt 

ABSTRACT

In the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United States the Court held that Treasury Regulations (“TRs”) interpreting the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) are entitled to the same administrative deference accorded to other agency regulations, as set out in Chevron, USA., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Counsel.  In the immediate wake of the Court’s clarification as to the proper standard for TRs, the circuit courts of appeals divided over a regulation interpreting a statute of limitations provision, I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) (“Section 6501”).  The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2012 in Home Concrete & Supply v. United States to resolve the split.  The question before the Court was whether a prior Supreme Court decision, Colony v. Commissioner, (1) conclusively decided that its interpretation of section 6501 was the only reasonable one, thus foreclosing alternative agency regulation, or (2) represented one possible interpretation, thus allowing future alternative agency regulation. The Court concluded that the Colony found section 6501 unambiguous, and thus invalidated the agency regulation.

[click to continue…]

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Summer 2012, Volume 117, Issue 1

Adminstrative Patent Levers
David Orozco  117 Penn St. L. Rev.1 (2012)
PDF View PDF  

ABSTRACT

This article describes the processes involving the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO’s) implementation of administrative patent levers related to business methods.  Administrative patent levers are conceptualized in this article as rules that represent a coordinated policy at the PTO to target a particular technology class, are often motivated by signals sent by actors within all three branches of government, and can be explained by positive political theory.  This article presents an account where policymakers in all branches of government reacted strongly to the dangers posed by business method patents.  The PTO’s behavior is explained under the “fire-alarm” theory of regulatory change, whereby an administrative agency responds to external institutional pressures and actors.  This conceptual analysis of administrative patent levers is then informed by a detailed analysis of business method rules that fall under this category of administrative policymaking at the PTO.

A descriptive account is then offered that predicts how the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) would review the PTO’s use of administrative patent levers.  Ultimately, the CAFC’s likely approach is undesirable because it fails to recognize that the PTO engages in policymaking.  A normative solution is offered whereby the reviewing courts would apply a “hard look” review under Section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act.  This standard would require that the PTO offer objective evidence that any administrative patent levers are warranted.  This standard would also require that the PTO address any valid arguments or evidence against the implementation of such technology-specific and policy-oriented rules.  Under this line of analysis, it is proposed that current business method administrative patent levers would fail to meet this standard of review.

Full Text

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Summer 2012, Volume 117, Issue 1

Synthetic Biology: Does Re-Writing Nature Require Re-Writing Regulation?
Jordan Paradise, J.D. & Ethan Fitzpatrick, Ph.D.  117 Penn St. L. Rev.53 (2012)
PDF View PDF

ABSTRACT

Technological advancements in the life sciences are continually pressing forward despite frequent and vocal resistance.  Examples of such advancements include reproductive technologies, genetics, stem cell research, nanotechnology, and now synthetic biology.  In May 2010, the J. Craig Venter Institute, a multidisciplinary scientific organization led by one of the first scientists to sequence the human genome, announced in the journal Science the creation of the first synthetic cell—a man-made, single-celled organism with the ability to self-replicate.  While hailed as a monumental step forward for science, the response from opponents was swift: stop the science from going forward, keep the products off the market, and protect society from the inherent and unknown risks.

Recognizing that there are measurable and important differences among advancements in the life sciences in terms of the touchstone risk-benefit dichotomy, this article will examine some promising synthetic biology developments in the medical realm in order to assess the application and performance of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulatory framework.  It concludes that the FDA is well equipped to assess and implement protections for products that fit into the traditional clinical trial, review and approval, and post-market regime.  However, unlike other developments in the life sciences, synthetic biology poses potential environmental problems not previously contemplated by the limited life-cycle inquiry undertaken by the FDA, suggesting that it may be necessary to reassess the regulation of medical products using synthetic biology techniques.

Full Text

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Summer 2012, Volume 117, Issue 1

The Need for a Comprehensive International Foreign Bribery Compliance Program, Covering A to Z, in an Expanding Global Anti-Bribery Environment
Jon Jordan  117 Penn St. L. Rev.89 (2012)
PDF View PDF

ABSTRACT

It is no longer safe for companies to rely exclusively on their FCPA compliance programs as a means for staying compliant with their foreign bribery obligations throughout the world.  Countries have committed themselves to combating foreign bribery through international treaty obligations and newer foreign bribery laws, such as the UK Bribery Act, that have imposed tougher anti-bribery standards on companies operating on an international basis.  International enforcement of these foreign bribery laws has also peaked in aggressiveness.

Companies need to tailor their FCPA compliance programs to adapt their programs to the current international anti-bribery environment.  They need to look at current international guidance on anti-bribery compliance programs and make their compliance programs truly international foreign bribery compliance programs that can better protect them in a world increasingly hostile to foreign bribery.

This article will explain the major laws and international treaties governing foreign bribery and the need for effective compliance procedures in an international anti-bribery environment.  This article will also explore some of the guidance provided by domestic and international authorities on procedures that should be included in an effective international foreign bribery compliance program.  Finally, this article will provide a list of minimum compliance procedures, covering A to Z, which should be incorporated in any comprehensive international foreign bribery compliance program.

Full Text

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Summer 2012, Volume 117, Issue 1

Morality as a Legitmate Government Interest
Daniel F. Piar  117 Penn St. L. Rev.139 (2012)
PDF View PDF 

 ABSTRACT
In recent years, the Supreme Court has taken inconsistent approaches to the question of whether morality can be a legitimate government interest sufficient to survive constitutional review.  This article identifies three such approaches:  (1) cases where morality is not considered as a legitimate government interest; (2) cases where morality is a legitimate government interest; and (3) cases where the Supreme Court has substituted its own moral judgment for those of the state actor under review.  None of these approaches is wholly satisfactory.  This article will argue that, in most cases, deferential review of morality-based state action fosters moral diversity, which is a social good to be sought through the law.  In cases of certain minorities, however, a more searching review is justified, and the expression of public morality should be subordinated to the protection of minority rights.

Full Text

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Summer 2012, Volume 117, Issue 1

Done with Distracted Driving:  Implications of Pennsylvania’s Ban on Text-Based Communication While Driving Under the State Constitution
Tara M. Franklin 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 171 (2012)
PDF View PDF  

ABSTRACT

In an era characterized by prolific use of cellular phones with ever-expanding capabilities, liberty and privacy ideals often compete with public safety interests.  Rising levels of injuries and fatalities from collisions attributed to cell phone use while driving have motivated Pennsylvania lawmakers to ban text-based communication while an individual is operating a vehicle.  Roadway safety is a legitimate and important governmental objective; however, the innumerable functions capable of being performed by a modern cell phone and the enormity of information able to be stored on such a device necessitates a policy consistent with Pennsylvania’s historic dedication to the privacy rights of its residents.

This Comment provides an overview of the problem of cell phone use while driving and discusses the primary elements of Pennsylvania’s prohibition of text messaging while driving.  In addition, the Comment examines Pennsylvania search and seizure law under article I, section 8 of the state constitution as it is applicable to scenarios that are likely to arise in the enforcement of Pennsylvania’s ban on text-based communication during vehicle operation.  The analysis reveals concerns regarding the enforcement of Pennsylvania’s distracted driving legislation and highlights issues concerning the privacy implications inherent in cell phone searches.  Lastly, this Comment seeks to provide solutions consistent with Pennsylvania case law to balance personal privacy and public safety.

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Summer 2012, Volume 117, Issue 1

Raising The “Bar” On Law School Data Reporting: Solutions To The Transparency Problem
Christopher Polchin 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 201 (2012)
PDF View PDF  

ABSTRACT

The difficult legal job market has brought attention to the reporting practices of law schools regarding their graduates’ employment data. Allegations have emerged that this employment data is highly misleading. This Comment outlines the nature of the law school reporting problem and the competitive environment that gave rise to it. In addition, this Comment examines possible solutions to the data problem, particularly the availability of civil remedies in tort for aggrieved students. Finally, this Comment addresses multiple alternatives that would provide increased clarity in law schools’ employment data.

Full Text

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Summer 2012, Volume 117, Issue 1

The FDA’s Attempt to Scare the Smoke Out of You:  Has the FDA Gone Too Far with the Nine New Cigarette Warning Labels?
Kristin M. Sempeles 117 Penn St. L. Rev.223 (2012)
PDF View PDF  

ABSTRACT

The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“The Act”)[1] of June 2009 marked the first change to cigarette warning labels in the United States in over 25 years.[2]  The Act, for the first time, gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authority to regulate tobacco products.[3]  In June 2011, under The Act, the FDA introduced the Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements (“The Rule”),[4] which imposed new regulations on cigarettes.[5]

Under The Rule, one of nine new graphic warning labels is required to appear on all cigarette packages and advertisements by September 2012.[6]  The Rule requires the warning labels to include colored images such as a plume of cigarette smoke enveloping an infant who is receiving a kiss from her mother; a healthy lung adjacent to a diseased lung; an image of the inside of a mouth afflicted with cancerous lesions; a bare-chested male cadaver lying in the morgue; and a woman weeping uncontrollably.[7]  In addition to the graphic warnings, The Rule mandates that all cigarette packages display both a direct exhortation to smokers to quit[8] and one of the nine specified textual warnings required by The Act.[9]  The warnings include “Cigarettes cause cancer,” “Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby,” and “Smoking can kill you.”[10]  Under The Act, the warning labels must be prominently displayed on the top 50 percent of the front and back panels of all cigarette packages and advertisements.[11]  Unlike previous warning labels, which conveyed purely factual information, the new warning labels cross over the line of informative warnings into anti-smoking advocacy.[12]  While The Act dictates many of the requirements for The Rule and provides the FDA with the power to regulate cigarettes, The Rule proposed by the FDA goes beyond its regulatory authority and imposes additional restrictions on the speech of tobacco companies.[13]

To further explore whether The Rule is constitutional or whether the courts should permanently enjoin the FDA from enforcing The Rule, this Comment will first outline the history of the FDA and relevant tobacco regulations in Section II.  Specifically, Subsection II.A will discuss the history of the FDA’s regulatory authority on tobacco products, and, in addition, will provide an overview of relevant legislative acts that have been enacted to regulate tobacco products.  Subsection II.B will analyze The Act,[14] the federal government’s most recent and controversial legislative act designed to impose new regulations on tobacco products.  In addition, Subsection II.C will examine The Rule[15] enacted by the FDA requiring tobacco companies to adhere nine new graphic warning labels to all cigarette packaging and advertisements.

Section III of this Comment will examine the development of the commercial freedom of speech doctrine[16] under the First Amendment.  Specifically, Subsection III.A will discuss the landmark case on commercial freedom of speech, Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York.[17]  This Supreme Court case provided a four-part test for determining the constitutionality of free speech, which will also be analyzed further.[18]  This analysis is followed by Subsection III.B, which examines Lorillard Tobacco Corporation v. Reilly,[19] one of the Supreme Court’s most recent commercial free speech cases.

Section IV will analyze whether The Rule is constitutional.  First, the analysis will assess The Rule under the Central Hudson four-part test[20] to determine if it violates the tobacco companies’ First Amendment rights.  Next, the analysis will focus on whether the FDA is overstepping its regulatory authority with the new restrictions[21] it imposes on tobacco companies under The Rule.

Section V of this Comment will address alternatives that the FDA can use to inform consumers about the adverse health effects of cigarettes without violating tobacco companies’ First Amendment rights.  This Comment will conclude with Part VI, which summarizes why The Rule will likely be found unconstitutional, the direction the government should take to benefit public health and safety, and why it is in the best interest of the public for the Supreme Court to grant a permanent injunction on the FDA’s Rule.

 


       [1].    Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Act (“The Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006 & Supp. 2009)).

       [2].    In 2009, President Obama signed into law the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, which gave the FDA exclusive jurisdiction to regulate tobacco, while specifically prohibiting the FDA from banning tobacco sales.  Id.  The Act marked the first change in cigarette labels since 1984 when the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act established four warning labels, which were to be rotated on cigarette packages and advertisements. Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1994).

       [3].    See Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201(a) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d)).

       [4].    FDA, Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements (“The Rule”), 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628-36,629 (June 22, 2011).

       [5].    See id.

       [6].    See 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,628-29.

       [7].    Id. at 36,696 (stating that graphics were selected to show depictions of the effects of sickness and disease caused by smoking).

       [8].    See id. (requiring each package to prominently display “1-800-QUIT-NOW,” a telephone number the FDA dedicated to provide cessation assistance).

       [9].    See Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333).

     [10].    See id.

     [11].    Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)) (“Each label statement required by paragraph (1) shall be located in the upper portion of the front and rear panels of the package, directly on the package underneath the cellophane or other clear wrapping.  Each label statement shall comprise the top 50 percent of the front and rear panels of the package.  The word ‘WARNING’ shall appear in capital letters and all text shall be in conspicuous and legible 17-point type.”).

     [12].    See discussion infra Section IV.

     [13].    Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d)) (providing requirements for the warning labels in order to “promote a greater public understanding of the risk associated with the use of tobacco products”).

     [14].    Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Act (“The Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009).

     [15].    FDA, Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements (“The Rule”), 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628 (June 22, 2011).

     [16].    See U.S. Const. amend. I.

     [17].    Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); see discussion infra Section III.A.

     [18].    See id.

     [19].    Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).

     [20].    See U.S. Const. amend. I.

     [21].    See FDA, Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements (“The Rule”), 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628 (June 22, 2011).
 

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Summer 2012, Volume 117, Issue 1

Quibbling with Quill:  Are States Powerless in Enforcing Sales and Use Tax-Related Obligations on Out-of-State Retailers?
Geoffrey E. Weyl 117 Penn St. L. Rev.253 (2012)
PDF  View PDF

ABSTRACT

Under the financial strain caused by the recent economic recession, many states have struggled to raise enough revenue to cover costs.[1]  Accordingly, many states have begun to pass so-called “Amazon” tax laws (“Amazon laws”).[2]  The purpose of these laws is to impose sales and use tax collection or reporting obligations on out-of-state online companies, such as Amazon.com (Amazon), on purchases by in-state buyers.  However, in Quill v. North Dakota,[3] the United States Supreme Court placed significant limitations on the ability of states to impose tax collection obligations on out-of-state vendors.[4]  Under Quill, the seller must have a “nexus” with the taxing state that does not violate either the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment[5] or the Commerce Clause[6] of the United States Constitution.[7]

The challenge of applying traditional concepts of sales tax collection obligations in the age of e-commerce is that most online companies do not have a significant physical presence in every state.[8]  Companies like Amazon use somewhat extreme tactics to avoid the burden and expense of collecting sales taxes in numerous jurisdictions by engaging in “entity isolation.”[9]  Entity isolation means that the parent corporation establishes a number of subsidiary companies to perform specific functions in a state.[10]  Because these subsidiaries are legally distinct from the parent company, the parent company never establishes a physical presence in-state and is thus not obligated to collect sales tax.[11]

Although entity isolation may have been taken to its extreme limit by e-retailers, the difficulty of requiring out-of-state companies to collect sales taxes is not unique to online vendors.  Historically, states have been unable to impose sales or use tax collection obligations on out-of-state companies such as catalog or mail-order companies.[12]  The states’ increased interest in collecting sales taxes from e-retailers is largely due to the explosion in e-commerce, which has grown tremendously in recent years.[13]  This explosion has caused states to lose potentially millions of dollars every year in sales tax revenue.[14]  States are not alone in their desire to have e-retailers collect sales taxes, as local brick-and-mortar stores have complained that online companies have an unfair competitive advantage because e-retailers are able to offer goods at lower prices by not collecting sales taxes.[15]  Therefore, as states have scrambled to raise additional revenue due to the “Great Recession” and to help local businesses become more competitive, many state legislatures have passed Amazon laws.[16]

In general, the Amazon laws are designed to require e-retailers to collect sales taxes.[17]  States have typically followed two models.[18]  The first is the New York model, which broadens the definition of what constitutes physical presence, or nexus, in the state to include the “affiliates” of e-retailers.[19]  Most states passing Amazon laws follow this approach.[20]  The second is the Colorado model, which requires out-of-state e-retailers to notify customers of the obligation to pay use taxes and, in some cases, provide information to the state’s department of revenue concerning remote sales made to customers living in the state.[21]  Remote sellers have fiercely criticized both models and have challenged the laws’ constitutionality.[22]  Ultimately, congressional action will be required to determine whether states can impose sales tax collection obligations on out-of-state retailers.[23]


       [1].    See Jeanine Poggi, Amazon Sales Tax:  The Battle, State by State, The Street (Oct. 24, 2011), http://bit.ly/i3fvwq.

       [2].    See Saul Hansell, Amazon Sues Over State Law on Collection of Sales Tax, N.Y. Times (May 2, 2008), http://nyti.ms/JdsJrs.  These laws are known as “Amazon” laws because they largely are targeted at Amazon.com, one of the largest e-retailers.  Id.

       [3].    Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).

       [4].    Id. at 298.

       [5].    U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

       [6].    U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

       [7].    Quill, 504 U.S. at 305.

       [8].    Daniel Tyler Cowan, New York’s Unconstitutional Tax on the Internet:  Amazon.com v. New York State Department of Taxation & Finance and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 N.C. L. Rev. 1423, 1428 (2010).

       [9].    See generally Michael R. Gordon, Up the Amazon Without a Paddle:  Examining Sales Taxes, Entity Isolation, and the “Affiliate Tax,” 11 N.C. J. L. & Tech. 299, 306-08 (2010) (using the model of Amazon.com to explain basic principles of entity isolation).

     [10].    Id.

     [11].    Id.

     [12].    E.g., Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967); see infra Part III.A (discussing due process requirements).

     [13].    U.S. Census Bureau News, Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales; 4th Quarter 2011, at 1, available at http://1.usa.gov/KnvYkd.  Total e-commerce sales in 2011 was estimated to be $194.3 billion, increasing approximately 16.1% from 2010.  Id.  Overall, e-commerce sales accounted for 4.6% of total retail sales.  Id.

     [14].    Donald Bruce et al., State and Local Government Sales Tax Revenue Losses from Electronic Commerce, ii, (May 18, 2009), http://bit.ly/8P2VUa.

     [15].    See Gordon, supra note 9, at 300.

     [16].    See Poggi, supra note 1.

     [17].    E.g., N.Y. Tax Law § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney 2011 through L.2011).

     [18].    There is a third model for states to collect sales taxes from out-of-state retailers known as the “affiliate nexus” theory, which essentially ignores entity isolation and examines the subsidiary and parent companies to see if there is a common ownership and a unitary business enterprise.  Andrew J. Haile, Affiliate Nexus in E-Commerce, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1803, 1805-06, 1813 (2012).  The “affiliate nexus” theory is beyond the scope of this Comment.  For more information on this theory, see David Gamage & Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State Taxation of E-Commerce, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 483, 520-22 (2012); see also N. R. Kleinfield, Amazon to Build New Jersey Warehouses and Collect State Tax, N.Y. Times (May 31, 2012), http://nyti.ms/Me7etf.

     [19].    N.Y. Tax Law § 1101(b)(8)(vi).  Amazon’s Associate’s program, for example, allows participants, known as “Associates,” to maintain links to merchandise on Amazon.com, and Amazon compensates these Associates with a percentage of the proceeds of sales that result from users clicking these links and making purchases.  Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. Dep’t of Taxation and Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842, 845 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009), aff’d as modified 913 N.Y.S.2d 129 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); see also Amazon.com, Associates Program Operating Agreement (Jul. 1, 2012), http://bit.ly/LkEpdI [hereinafter Operating Agreement].

     [20].    E.g., N.Y. Tax § 1101(b)(8)(vi); Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 6203(c)(5) (West 2011) (effective June 29, 2011, temporarily repealed on September 23, 2011 until September 15, 2012 or January 1, 2013, depending on enactment of federal law); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 12-407(a)(12)(L) (West 2011); 35 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 105/2(1.1) (2011); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-164.8(b)(3) (2011); R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-18-15(a)(2) (2011).

     [21].    Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-112(3.5) (2011); Okla. Stat. tit. 68, § 1406.1 (2011).

     [22].    E.g., Amazon.com, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 846; Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Huber, No. 10-cv-01546-REB-CBS, 2012 WL 1079175 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012); Performance Mktg. Ass’n, Inc. v. Hamer, No. 2011-CH-26333, 2012 WL 1986181 (Ill. Cir. May 11, 2012).

     [23].    See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing Congressional action).

PDF  Full Text

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Volume 116, Issue 4

Articles

Metaphors, Models, and Meaning in Contract Law

By Jeffrey M. Lipshaw. 116 Penn St. L. Rev. 987.

Why does there seem to be such a wide gap between the subject matter of the usual first-year contracts course and what practitioners (particularly transactional lawyers) actually experience? This article is an attempt to bridge the gap, combining insights from academic theory and real-world law practice. My claim is that the law as discipline has developed its own powerful but self-contained conceptual framework—in the coinage of one noted scholar, “an epistemic trap.” The subject matter of contract law, something that is largely the creation of private parties and not the state, requires dealing with legal truth not just as a coherent body of normative doctrine, but also correspondent in some way to the parties’ actual self-legislation. In other words, the exercise of understanding the law relating to transactions is not wholly descriptive—”to what did the parties agree”? Nor is it wholly normative—“what should be done when the parties dispute the nature or terms of their agreement after the fact?” Much of the difficulty of the first-year contract law enterprise lies in this conflation of the law’s usual after-the-fact normative focus (as, say, in tort or criminal law) with an inquiry into what private law the parties actually meant to create before the fact.

I propose escaping the epistemic trap with a turn to metaphor theory. The underlying metaphor common to prevailing conceptions of contract law, and which demands some form of correspondent truth from the contract (and contract law), is “contract as model of the transaction.” I suggest alternative metaphors of categories as containers, ideas as objects, and the transaction lifecycle as a journey. The goal is to focus on the “subjective to objective” process of the transactional lifecycle, and to consider the perspectives of the participants in or observers of that process. In particular, I consider the models and metaphors that shape the conceptual frames from within which those participants and observers perceive, make use of, and derive meaning from what end up as contracts, which are best thought of as the objective manifestations of inter-subjective agreements.

keep reading


Pay Transparency

By Gowri Ramachandran. 116 Penn St. L. Rev. 1043

Pay discrimination, like many forms of discrimination, is a particularly stubborn problem. In many instances, just as with other forms of discrimination, it is unrealistic to allocate all the blame and burden on a single actor, whether it be an employer or employee. Thus, the traditional civil rights regime in which an individual actor is held liable for the discrimination does a poor job of dealing with this problem. I propose an intervention—pay transparency—that would help prevent, root out, and correct the discrimination in the first place, instead of relying on after the fact blame and liability.

Pay transparency—the ability for employees to find out what other employees in their workplace make—is rare outside of public employment, and cultural norms against talking about one’s income may make the concept anxiety-producing to some readers. Yet, unlike many other approaches to reducing seemingly “blameless” discrimination, such as targeting unconscious discrimination, or potentially counterproductive debiasing efforts, incentivizing pay transparency can fit very comfortably within our legal framework. By turning pay transparency into an affirmative defense to pay discrimination claims, this preventive measure can be woven neatly into our current approach to civil rights enforcement and notions of individual responsibility.

keep reading


Overinterpreting Law

By Robert F. Blomquist. 116 Penn St. L. Rev. 1081

Overinterpretation has attracted considerable attention in other fields, such as literary studies, science, and rhetoric, but it is under-theorized in law. This Article attempts to initiate a theory of legal overinterpretation by examining the rhetorical nature of excess, the sociological dimensions of roles in team performances, and citation to legal and non-legal sources that have discussed overinterpretation. The Article concludes by positing illustrative categories of potential legal overinterpretation, and providing an examination of ways to minimize legal overinterpretation through a judicious, pragmatic balance between abstract considerations and concrete considerations in law.

keep reading


Changing the Model Law School: Rethinking U.S. Legal Education in (Most) Schools

By Nancy B. Rapoport. 116 Penn St. L. Rev. 1119

This essay argues that discussions of educational reform in U.S. law schools have suffered from a fundamental misconception: that the education provided in all of the American Bar Association-accredited schools is roughly the same. A better description of the educational opportunities provided by ABA-accredited law schools would group the schools into three rough clusters: the “elite” law schools, the modal (most frequently occurring) law schools, and the precarious law schools. Because the elite law schools do not need much “reforming,” the better focus of reform would concentrate on the modal and precarious schools; however, both elite and modal law schools could benefit from some changes to help law students move from understanding the theoretical underpinnings of law to understanding how to translate those underpinnings into practice. “Practice” itself is a complex concept, requiring both an understanding of the law and an understanding of how to relate well to others. Because law students may not understand how to relate well to those with different backgrounds from their own, law schools should do more to explain how one’s perspective is both limiting and mutable. Too many law schools suggest that students can “see” different perspectives by, essentially, merely thinking harder. The essay concludes with some suggestions regarding possible reforms of U.S. legal education, focusing primarily on the modal law schools.

keep reading


Comments

Right to Exclude or Forced to Include? Creating a Better Balancing Test for Sexual Orientation Discrimination Cases

By Sara A. Gelsinger. 116 Penn St. L. Rev. 1155

Beginning at a young age, individuals start choosing to exclude others. Toddlers decide who will be their snack-time seatmates. Children choose whom to exclude from their playground dodge ball team. College fraternities and sororities induct only chosen classmates into their organizations. Businesses pick their preferred employees from stacks of applications.

The ability to include or exclude individuals is often taken for granted as an individual’s or organization’s assumed right. But what happens when an organization refuses to admit a member because she is female? Or because he is Latino? Or because she identifies as a lesbian? Does eradicating discrimination trump one’s choice of association?

In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Supreme Court stated that one’s “freedom of association . . . plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.” However, the Court also recognized that “[i]nfringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests. . . . Discrimination based on archaic and overbroad assumptions . . . deprives persons of their individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide participation in political, economic and cultural life.”

A modern-day civil rights battle rages between groups asserting their constitutional right of expressive association and states attempting to eliminate discrimination by enacting non-discrimination statutes. This Comment will argue that the Supreme Court has failed to recognize that eradicating sexual orientation-based discrimination is a compelling state interest. It will also suggest a proposal for balancing an organization’s right of freedom of association with a state’s interest in eradicating discrimination through non-discrimination statutes.

keep reading


Where Presumption Overshoots: The Foundation and Effects of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation v. Clayton

By Alan C. Green. 116 Penn St. L. Rev. 1181

At the core of a just and well-ordered society lies a dedicated assurance of the right to due process of law. Due process is “intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private right and distributive justice.” However, as Justice Frankfurter famously declared, “‘Due process’ is, perhaps, the least frozen concept of our law—the least confined to history and the most absorptive of powerful social standards of a progressive society.”

The principle of due process creates a tension between the authority of the legislature and that of the courts. On the one hand, due process “is a restraint on the legislative . . . powers of government and cannot be construed as to leave congress free to make any ‘due process of law,’ by its mere will.” On the other hand, “it by no means is true that every law is void which may seem to the judges who pass upon it excessive, unsuited to its ostensible end, or based upon conceptions of morality with which they disagree.”

Since the era of Lochner v. New York, perhaps no due process doctrine illuminates this tension greater than the irrebuttable presumption doctrine (“IPD”). Developed in the early 1970s, the doctrine states:

It is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to [deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property] on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption . . . when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when the State has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination.”

In practice, IPD invalidates state action that purports to speak in terms of determinate criteria, but does not allow for the admission or consideration of evidence plainly relevant to those criteria.

keep reading


Empathy for the Devil: How Prisoners Got a New Property Right

By Marianne Sawicki. 116 Penn St. L. Rev. 1209

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit opened a “can of worms” when it declared “a new property right” for prisoners in Rodney Burns v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. The court held that assessing a charge against the funds in an inmate account impairs a cognizable property interest even before the actual deduction. Constitutional due-process protections attach to this newly recognized “right to security.” The Burns worms are bait for the hooks on two lines of inquiry. First, against a tide of judicial deference toward prison administrators, how did the Third Circuit reach this surprising result? Second, in its wake, what changes in prison disciplinary procedures should occur?

An analysis of the Burns decision will establish that the court adopted an empathetic stance toward the prisoner-appellant because it relied on an analogy to something familiar: the relation between a debtor and a judgment creditor. The court declined to demonize the prisoner rhetorically, as commonly happens when a prisoner files a complaint about prison conditions. Empathy plays an unavoidable, if often unrecognized, role in human decision making. But empathy generates bias in legal decisions only where the court, unaware of empathy’s function, allows it to work in a one-sided manner. A jurisprudence of empathy actively compensates for unfamiliarity with the perspectives and conditions of any party, especially one whose circumstances differ socially from those of judges. The Burns decision sheds light on other decisions where courts have rejected prisoners’ assertions of constitutional claims.

Before analyzing Burns, this Comment provides background with a survey of the landmark cases that define due process rights for prisoners. Although “[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country,” incarceration brings limitations to constitutional rights. Those limits, imposed by the United States Supreme Court, bind state courts as well. Pennsylvania precedents provide part of the legal background for Burns because state law governs administrative procedures and regulations that affect prisoners in state correctional institutions. While the judicial rulings and administrative law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania do not bind other states, there is no reason to doubt that they are comparable to those of other states. The Third Circuit’s holding in Burns is binding precedent for federal courts within that circuit, and it may be persuasive elsewhere because it addresses “an issue of first impression across the courts of appeals.”

keep reading


Redefining Searches Incident to Arrest: Gant’s Effect on Chimel

By Jackie L. Starbuck. 116 Penn St. L. Rev. 1253.

One of the Supreme Court’s “most important responsibilities is to offer clear guidance to lower courts,” especially in matters of constitutional law. For decades, the Supreme Court has held that warrantless search or seizure is “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” One such exception is a search incident to a lawful arrest. When an officer makes an arrest, the officer may search the arrestee’s person and the area within the arrestee’s immediate control. The Supreme Court established two rationales behind the search incident to arrest in Chimel v. California: (1) the police may remove any weapons the arrestee may use to resist arrest or to escape; and (2) the police may search for and seize any evidence to prevent its concealment or destruction.

Defining the area within the arrestee’s immediate control has proven troublesome, especially in the context of arresting a vehicle occupant. With respect to vehicle search, the Court in New York v. Belton handled this issue by creating a bright-line rule that an officer making a lawful arrest of the occupant of a vehicle may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle and all containers therein. Although the Court’s rule appeared to be applicable only in the vehicle context, lower courts expanded the rule to searches incident to arrest outside of the vehicle context, and the Supreme Court did nothing to curb or encourage that expansion. The Court recently limited the Belton rule in Arizona v. Gant, where the Court held that police may search a vehicle incident to an arrest of the vehicle’s occupant only when the arrestee is “unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment” at the time of the search.

In the short time since Gant was decided, lower courts have split on whether the new rule announced in Gant applies to searches incident to arrest outside of the vehicle context. The Third Circuit has applied the Gant rationale to a bag held by the arrestee at the time of arrest and dropped when the police placed him under arrest. Noting that courts have used vehicle cases to justify searches in non-vehicle contexts for years, the court used Gant to justify a search of the bag because the bag was accessible to the arrestee. The District Court for the District of Nebraska also would have expanded Gant, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated the court’s reasoning and limited Gant to vehicular searches incident to arrest. Again, the Supreme Court has remained silent on the issue of whether Gant is applicable outside of the vehicle context.

keep reading

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Redefining Searches Incident to Arrest: Gant’s Effect on Chimel

By Jackie L. Starbuck.
PDF

116 Penn St. L. Rev. 1253.

One of the Supreme Court’s “most important responsibilities is to offer clear guidance to lower courts,” especially in matters of constitutional law. For decades, the Supreme Court has held that warrantless search or seizure is “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” One such exception is a search incident to a lawful arrest. When an officer makes an arrest, the officer may search the arrestee’s person and the area within the arrestee’s immediate control. The Supreme Court established two rationales behind the search incident to arrest in Chimel v. California: (1) the police may remove any weapons the arrestee may use to resist arrest or to escape; and (2) the police may search for and seize any evidence to prevent its concealment or destruction.

Defining the area within the arrestee’s immediate control has proven troublesome, especially in the context of arresting a vehicle occupant. With respect to vehicle search, the Court in New York v. Belton handled this issue by creating a bright-line rule that an officer making a lawful arrest of the occupant of a vehicle may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle and all containers therein. Although the Court’s rule appeared to be applicable only in the vehicle context, lower courts expanded the rule to searches incident to arrest outside of the vehicle context, and the Supreme Court did nothing to curb or encourage that expansion. The Court recently limited the Belton rule in Arizona v. Gant, where the Court held that police may search a vehicle incident to an arrest of the vehicle’s occupant only when the arrestee is “unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment” at the time of the search.

In the short time since Gant was decided, lower courts have split on whether the new rule announced in Gant applies to searches incident to arrest outside of the vehicle context. The Third Circuit has applied the Gant rationale to a bag held by the arrestee at the time of arrest and dropped when the police placed him under arrest. Noting that courts have used vehicle cases to justify searches in non-vehicle contexts for years, the court used Gant to justify a search of the bag because the bag was accessible to the arrestee. The District Court for the District of Nebraska also would have expanded Gant, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated the court’s reasoning and limited Gant to vehicular searches incident to arrest. Again, the Supreme Court has remained silent on the issue of whether Gant is applicable outside of the vehicle context.

keep reading.

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Empathy for the Devil: How Prisoners Got a New Property Right

By Marianne Sawicki.
PDF

116 Penn St. L. Rev. 1209.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit opened a “can of worms” when it declared “a new property right” for prisoners in Rodney Burns v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. The court held that assessing a charge against the funds in an inmate account impairs a cognizable property interest even before the actual deduction. Constitutional due-process protections attach to this newly recognized “right to security.” The Burns worms are bait for the hooks on two lines of inquiry. First, against a tide of judicial deference toward prison administrators, how did the Third Circuit reach this surprising result? Second, in its wake, what changes in prison disciplinary procedures should occur?

An analysis of the Burns decision will establish that the court adopted an empathetic stance toward the prisoner-appellant because it relied on an analogy to something familiar: the relation between a debtor and a judgment creditor. The court declined to demonize the prisoner rhetorically, as commonly happens when a prisoner files a complaint about prison conditions. Empathy plays an unavoidable, if often unrecognized, role in human decision making. But empathy generates bias in legal decisions only where the court, unaware of empathy’s function, allows it to work in a one-sided manner. A jurisprudence of empathy actively compensates for unfamiliarity with the perspectives and conditions of any party, especially one whose circumstances differ socially from those of judges. The Burns decision sheds light on other decisions where courts have rejected prisoners’ assertions of constitutional claims.

Before analyzing Burns, this Comment provides background with a survey of the landmark cases that define due process rights for prisoners. Although “[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country,” incarceration brings limitations to constitutional rights. Those limits, imposed by the United States Supreme Court, bind state courts as well. Pennsylvania precedents provide part of the legal background for Burns because state law governs administrative procedures and regulations that affect prisoners in state correctional institutions. While the judicial rulings and administrative law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania do not bind other states, there is no reason to doubt that they are comparable to those of other states. The Third Circuit’s holding in Burns is binding precedent for federal courts within that circuit, and it may be persuasive elsewhere because it addresses “an issue of first impression across the courts of appeals.”

keep reading.

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Where Presumption Overshoots: The Foundation and Effects of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation v. Clayton

By Alan C. Green.
PDF

116 Penn St. L. Rev. 1181.

At the core of a just and well-ordered society lies a dedicated assurance of the right to due process of law. Due process is “intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private right and distributive justice.” However, as Justice Frankfurter famously declared, “‘Due process’ is, perhaps, the least frozen concept of our law—the least confined to history and the most absorptive of powerful social standards of a progressive society.”

The principle of due process creates a tension between the authority of the legislature and that of the courts. On the one hand, due process “is a restraint on the legislative . . . powers of government and cannot be construed as to leave congress free to make any ‘due process of law,’ by its mere will.” On the other hand, “it by no means is true that every law is void which may seem to the judges who pass upon it excessive, unsuited to its ostensible end, or based upon conceptions of morality with which they disagree.”

Since the era of Lochner v. New York, perhaps no due process doctrine illuminates this tension greater than the irrebuttable presumption doctrine (“IPD”). Developed in the early 1970s, the doctrine states:

It is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to [deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property] on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption . . . when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when the State has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination.”

In practice, IPD invalidates state action that purports to speak in terms of determinate criteria, but does not allow for the admission or consideration of evidence plainly relevant to those criteria.

keep reading.

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Right to Exclude or Forced to Include? Creating a Better Balancing Test for Sexual Orientation Discrimination Cases

By Sara A. Gelsinger.
PDF

116 Penn St. L. Rev. 1155.

Beginning at a young age, individuals start choosing to exclude others. Toddlers decide who will be their snack-time seatmates. Children choose whom to exclude from their playground dodge ball team. College fraternities and sororities induct only chosen classmates into their organizations. Businesses pick their preferred employees from stacks of applications.

The ability to include or exclude individuals is often taken for granted as an individual’s or organization’s assumed right. But what happens when an organization refuses to admit a member because she is female? Or because he is Latino? Or because she identifies as a lesbian? Does eradicating discrimination trump one’s choice of association?

In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Supreme Court stated that one’s “freedom of association . . . plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.” However, the Court also recognized that “[i]nfringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests. . . . Discrimination based on archaic and overbroad assumptions . . . deprives persons of their individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide participation in political, economic and cultural life.”

A modern-day civil rights battle rages between groups asserting their constitutional right of expressive association and states attempting to eliminate discrimination by enacting non-discrimination statutes. This Comment will argue that the Supreme Court has failed to recognize that eradicating sexual orientation-based discrimination is a compelling state interest. It will also suggest a proposal for balancing an organization’s right of freedom of association with a state’s interest in eradicating discrimination through non-discrimination statutes.

keep reading.

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Changing the Model Law School: Rethinking U.S. Legal Education in (Most) Schools

By Nancy B. Rapoport.
PDF

116 Penn St. L. Rev. 1119.

ABSTRACT

This essay argues that discussions of educational reform in U.S. law schools have suffered from a fundamental misconception: that the education provided in all of the American Bar Association-accredited schools is roughly the same. A better description of the educational opportunities provided by ABA-accredited law schools would group the schools into three rough clusters: the “elite” law schools, the modal (most frequently occurring) law schools, and the precarious law schools. Because the elite law schools do not need much “reforming,” the better focus of reform would concentrate on the modal and precarious schools; however, both elite and modal law schools could benefit from some changes to help law students move from understanding the theoretical underpinnings of law to understanding how to translate those underpinnings into practice. “Practice” itself is a complex concept, requiring both an understanding of the law and an understanding of how to relate well to others. Because law students may not understand how to relate well to those with different backgrounds from their own, law schools should do more to explain how one’s perspective is both limiting and mutable. Too many law schools suggest that students can “see” different perspectives by, essentially, merely thinking harder. The essay concludes with some suggestions regarding possible reforms of U.S. legal education, focusing primarily on the modal law schools.

keep reading.

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Overinterpreting Law

By Robert F. Blomquist.
PDF

116 Penn St. L. Rev. 1081.

Overinterpretation has attracted considerable attention in other fields, such as literary studies, science, and rhetoric, but it is under-theorized in law. This Article attempts to initiate a theory of legal overinterpretation by examining the rhetorical nature of excess, the sociological dimensions of roles in team performances, and citation to legal and non-legal sources that have discussed overinterpretation. The Article concludes by positing illustrative categories of potential legal overinterpretation, and providing an examination of ways to minimize legal overinterpretation through a judicious, pragmatic balance between abstract considerations and concrete considerations in law.

keep reading.

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Pay Transparency

By Gowri Ramachandran.
PDF

116 Penn St. L. Rev. 1043.

Pay discrimination, like many forms of discrimination, is a particularly stubborn problem. In many instances, just as with other forms of discrimination, it is unrealistic to allocate all the blame and burden on a single actor, whether it be an employer or employee. Thus, the traditional civil rights regime in which an individual actor is held liable for the discrimination does a poor job of dealing with this problem. I propose an intervention—pay transparency—that would help prevent, root out, and correct the discrimination in the first place, instead of relying on after the fact blame and liability.

Pay transparency—the ability for employees to find out what other employees in their workplace make—is rare outside of public employment, and cultural norms against talking about one’s income may make the concept anxiety-producing to some readers. Yet, unlike many other approaches to reducing seemingly “blameless” discrimination, such as targeting unconscious discrimination, or potentially counterproductive debiasing efforts, incentivizing pay transparency can fit very comfortably within our legal framework. By turning pay transparency into an affirmative defense to pay discrimination claims, this preventive measure can be woven neatly into our current approach to civil rights enforcement and notions of individual responsibility.

keep reading.

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Metaphors, Models, and Meaning in Contract Law

By Jeffrey M. Lipshaw.
PDF

116 Penn St. L. Rev. 987.

Why does there seem to be such a wide gap between the subject matter of the usual first-year contracts course and what practitioners (particularly transactional lawyers) actually experience? This article is an attempt to bridge the gap, combining insights from academic theory and real-world law practice. My claim is that the law as discipline has developed its own powerful but self-contained conceptual framework—in the coinage of one noted scholar, “an epistemic trap.” The subject matter of contract law, something that is largely the creation of private parties and not the state, requires dealing with legal truth not just as a coherent body of normative doctrine, but also correspondent in some way to the parties’ actual self-legislation. In other words, the exercise of understanding the law relating to transactions is not wholly descriptive—”to what did the parties agree”? Nor is it wholly normative—“what should be done when the parties dispute the nature or terms of their agreement after the fact?” Much of the difficulty of the first-year contract law enterprise lies in this conflation of the law’s usual after-the-fact normative focus (as, say, in tort or criminal law) with an inquiry into what private law the parties actually meant to create before the fact.

I propose escaping the epistemic trap with a turn to metaphor theory. The underlying metaphor common to prevailing conceptions of contract law, and which demands some form of correspondent truth from the contract (and contract law), is “contract as model of the transaction.” I suggest alternative metaphors of categories as containers, ideas as objects, and the transaction lifecycle as a journey. The goal is to focus on the “subjective to objective” process of the transactional lifecycle, and to consider the perspectives of the participants in or observers of that process. In particular, I consider the models and metaphors that shape the conceptual frames from within which those participants and observers perceive, make use of, and derive meaning from what end up as contracts, which are best thought of as the objective manifestations of inter-subjective agreements.

keep reading.

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Volume 116, Issue 3, Winter 2012

Introduction

Introduction: The Deal Lawyers’ Guide to Public and Private Company Acquisitions

By H. Rodgin Cohen and Samuel C. Thompson, Jr.116 Penn St. L. Rev. 605.

We are the Co-Chairs of the Eighth Annual Institute on Corporate, Securities, and Related Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions (the “M&A Institute”), which was jointly sponsored by the Penn State Center for the Study of Mergers and Acquisitions and the Center for CLE of the New York City Bar. The Institute was held at the New York City Bar on October 13 and 14, 2011.

This Symposium Issue of the Penn State Law Review contains (1) annotated transcripts of three of the panels at the M&A Institute, and (2) five articles based on, and extensions of, several of the many presentations made at the Institute. It gives us great pleasure to introduce the transcripts and articles contained in this Symposium Issue.

keep reading


Transcripts

Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies in Transactions Structured as Friendly Tender Offers

Moderated by Richard E. Climan.116 Penn St. L. Rev. 615

As the title of this segment suggests, we’re going to be confining our discussions this morning to acquisitions of publicly traded companies. More specifically, we’re going to limit our focus to acquisitions of U.S.-based Delaware corporations with shares listed on a U.S. securities exchange. We will not be addressing acquisitions of privately held companies, which will be covered in a separate panel this afternoon.

With cash remaining the acquisition currency of choice in today’s M&A marketplace, we’re going to further limit our discussions this morning to deals in which the acquisition currency used to pay the purchase price consists exclusively of cold, hard cash on the barrelhead, as distinct from, say, shares of the buyer’s stock or some other form of non-cash consideration.

keep reading


Private Company Acquisitions: A Mock Negotiation

Moderated by Byron F. Egan.116 Penn St. L. Rev. 743.

We are going to frame our discussion around a hypothetical fact situation. The buyer is an acquisition entity (“Buyer”) organized by a Texas private equity financial buyer. The target corporation is a Delaware corporation (“Target”) headquartered in Manhattan and owned by an extended and disjointed family (now approximately 30 stockholders). Target manufactures equipment at an old facility, which it leases in Brooklyn. The term sheet that the parties initially discussed, without the benefit of counsel, contemplated a negotiated sale for cash of all of the stock of Target to Buyer.

Now, as often happens, Buyer has looked at the term sheet with the benefit of counsel and has realized that the transaction, as set forth in that term sheet, is problematic from Buyer’s perspective. Based on my recommendations, Buyer is going to propose that we restructure this transaction from a stock sale to a sale of assets, or perhaps some combination of both, and is going to submit its form of asset purchase agreement (the “Proposed Agreement”).

keep reading


Oral Arguments in a Hypothetical Appeal of Air Products v. Airgas to the Delaware Supreme Court

Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Moderator
Stephen P. Lamb, Presiding Justice
William M. Lafferty, Counsel for Petitioner
Kevin R. Shannon, Counsel for Respondent116 Penn St. L. Rev. 811

As indicated earlier, our luncheon program is a mock argument before a fictitious Delaware Supreme Court consisting of you, our audience, of an appeal of the Airgas case. In Airgas, Chancellor Chandler of the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld Airgas’s poison pill.

Air Products and Airgas are both Delaware corporations. Both corporations are headquartered in Pennsylvania and are in the industrial gas business. Between October 2009 and February 2010, Air Products made a series of purchase offers to the Airgas Board, first at $60 per share and then at $62. Airgas rejected each offer. Air Products followed up on February 11, 2010, with a $60 all-cash, all-share tender offer to the Airgas stockholders. The Airgas Board recommended against the offer as inadequate and refused to redeem its poison pill.

keep reading


Articles

A Brief Introduction to the Fiduciary Duties of Directors Under Delaware Law

By William M. Lafferty, Lisa A. Schmidt, and Donald J. Wolfe, Jr. 116 Penn St. L. Rev. 837

The negotiation of a high-profile merger transaction often bears surprising similarity to a romantic courtship.

Mergers often start innocently enough—a text message, a phone call, or perhaps an e-mail between rival CEOs. In one way or another, the “ask” is made. Are you interested? Available? Can we work something out? The exact words are not really important. On at least one occasion, simple doggerel has been used to start the conversation.

If the answer is “no,” the parties typically will go their separate ways, perhaps leaving open the possibility of revisiting the idea at some point in the future. On occasion, however, a rejection can prompt hard feelings.

On the other hand, if the answer is “yes,” the situation can often advance quickly. If the target and the suitor are a match, a deal can be agreed to and consummated in a matter of months or even weeks. If word should spread that the target corporation is not averse to courtship, other potential suitors may come forward and complications can ensue. In such circumstances, the directors of the target corporation often opt to resolve the choice presented by putting the fitness of the competing suitors to the test before making their decision. Secure in its knowledge of the available partners, and in order to evidence its commitment to the relationship, the target corporation may agree to terms designed to discourage third-party advances by including in the merger agreement defensive provisions such as termination fees, match rights, or “force-the-vote” provisions. Such provisions add a layer of protection to the declared relationship and proclaim the intent to go steady. The target that fears that the initial expression of interest could dissipate while an extensive search is undertaken may instead choose to sign an agreement that is subject to a condition subsequent. This allows the target to play the field by way of a post-signing market check or go-shop process, at least for a while before things get too serious.

keep reading


Basic Tax Issues in Acquisition Transactions

By Michael L. Schler. 116 Penn St. L. Rev. 879

This article discusses basic U.S. tax issues that arise in an acquisition transaction. It is intended primarily for readers who are corporate lawyers rather than tax lawyers. The discussion is written in general terms and does not include every exception to the general rules (and exception to exception, and so on).

Most importantly, it is vital for the corporate lawyer to consult a tax lawyer at every stage of an acquisition transaction. The tax rules are detailed, often counterintuitive, and always changing. Details that are minor from a corporate point of view, such as which corporation survives a merger, can have vast consequences from a tax point of view. The particular structure of a transaction can mean that one party might achieve a significant tax benefit at the expense of the other party (e.g., your client), or even worse, both parties could end up significantly worse off than if a different corporate structure had been used. In addition, it is not enough merely to rely on the Internal Revenue Code and regulations, because there is a large body of Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) rulings, judicial decisions, and nonstatutory doctrines.

It is also essential that the tax lawyer begin to participate in a transaction at the very beginning. This is usually when the basic structural elements of the transaction are determined. It is much easier to propose a particular structure at the time an initial term sheet is being negotiated than it is to propose a change in structure after both sides (with or without their respective tax lawyers) have agreed to it. Likewise, detailed ongoing participation by the tax lawyer is necessary to be sure that changes in documentation do not change the tax results that are important to the client.

keep reading


Asset Acquisitions: Assuming and Avoiding Liabilities

By Byron F. Egan. 116 Penn St. L. Rev. 913

Buying or selling a closely held business, including the purchase of a division or a subsidiary, can be structured as (i) a statutory combination such as a statutory merger or share exchange, (ii) a negotiated purchase of outstanding stock from existing shareholders, or (iii) a purchase of assets from the business. The transaction typically revolves around an agreement between the buyer and the selling entity, and sometimes its owners, setting forth the terms of the deal.

Purchases of assets are characterized by the acquisition by the buyer of specified assets from an entity, which may or may not represent all or substantially all of its assets, and the assumption by the buyer of specified liabilities of the seller, which typically do not represent all of the liabilities of the seller. When the parties choose to structure an acquisition as an asset purchase, there are unique drafting and negotiating issues regarding the specification of which assets and liabilities are transferred to the buyer, as well as the representations, closing conditions, indemnification, and other provisions essential to memorializing the bargain reached by the parties. There are also statutory (e.g., bulk sales and fraudulent transfer statutes) and common law issues (e.g., de facto merger and other successor liability theories) unique to asset purchase transactions that could result in an asset purchaser being held liable for liabilities of the seller which it did not agree to assume.

keep reading


Judge and Banker—Valuation Analyses in the Delaware Courts

By William A. Groll and David Leinwand. 116 Penn St. L. Rev. 957

Litigation challenging public company merger and acquisition transactions is on the increase. Whereas, not too long ago, only transactions involving director conflicts of interest or other potentially troubling facts would bring forth the plaintiffs’ lawyers, today, lawsuits can be expected challenging even those transactions in which a board of directors has, by all readily apparent views, pursued a reasonable process in fulfillment of its fiduciary duties, garnering a significant premium for its shareholders. In such merger and acquisition litigation, the financial advisor to the board of directors often finds itself in the center of the lawyers’ fray with its valuation analyses a crucial factor in the case. Senior bankers are in depositions and before judges more often than in the past, and now, more than ever, financial advisors should expect their analyses to be subject to close scrutiny in the course of deal litigation.

Recent cases decided in the state courts of Delaware, where most merger and acquisition litigation historically has been brought, provide useful guidance for lawyers who counsel financial advisors as well as those who advise principals to transactions regarding how to mitigate litigation risk arising out of a financial advisor’s opinion and analyses. The cases helpful to practitioners can be divided roughly into two groups—appraisal/entire fairness cases and disclosure cases.

The appraisal and entire fairness cases provide guidance regarding the substance and application of valuation analyses. In a typical appraisal action, for instance, the court must determine the “fair value” of the shares at issue, and such determination usually is based on a review of competing valuation analyses submitted by the parties. Similarly, the entire fairness standard, which is applied to certain conflict of interest transactions, requires the court to determine whether an “entirely fair price” was paid to shareholders. In the course of such determination, the court often will closely scrutinize the valuation work performed by the financial advisor for the subject company’s board of directors.

keep reading


Exchange Consolidations: Help or Hospice?

By Philip McBride Johnson. 116 Penn St. L. Rev. 977.

Two blacksmiths who had competed to shoe the horses of the townspeople for 30 years watched as the first automobile drove down the main street. Recognizing that something big was occurring, they set aside their rivalry and met to discuss a response. When the blacksmiths emerged, they announced that they were merging their blacksmith business.

Might this be the future for the growing number of central financial markets that have announced interest in combining forces, often across national lines? In both the securities and derivatives worlds, new rivals have emerged to offer comparable services for similar transactions. This article raises the question whether exchange mergers can stem or reverse the gains made by those alternative execution methodologies. The article is based in part on my own experience working with markets for over 50 years, and incorporates a generous dose of conjecture. Unfortunately, if there are empirical data that resolve this matter definitively, I have been unable to locate them.

Markets for financial instruments and commodities have evolved over the centuries from the occasional get-together of nearby producers and buyers to nanosecond electronic execution facilities that operate from anywhere with lightning speed (“flash trades”), and often operate beyond the berm (read “dark pools”). The preeminence of even the mature central exchanges has been challenged by these new systems. Like the blacksmiths, one might wonder why, instead of merging with each other, they do not either acquire or create competitive mechanisms to confront these rivals head-on.

keep reading


{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Exchange Consolidations: Help or Hospice?

By Philip McBride Johnson.
PDF

116 Penn St. L. Rev. 977.

Two blacksmiths who had competed to shoe the horses of the townspeople for 30 years watched as the first automobile drove down the main street. Recognizing that something big was occurring, they set aside their rivalry and met to discuss a response. When the blacksmiths emerged, they announced that they were merging their blacksmith business.

Might this be the future for the growing number of central financial markets that have announced interest in combining forces, often across national lines? In both the securities and derivatives worlds, new rivals have emerged to offer comparable services for similar transactions. This article raises the question whether exchange mergers can stem or reverse the gains made by those alternative execution methodologies. The article is based in part on my own experience working with markets for over 50 years, and incorporates a generous dose of conjecture. Unfortunately, if there are empirical data that resolve this matter definitively, I have been unable to locate them.

Markets for financial instruments and commodities have evolved over the centuries from the occasional get-together of nearby producers and buyers to nanosecond electronic execution facilities that operate from anywhere with lightning speed (“flash trades”), and often operate beyond the berm (read “dark pools”). The preeminence of even the mature central exchanges has been challenged by these new systems. Like the blacksmiths, one might wonder why, instead of merging with each other, they do not either acquire or create competitive mechanisms to confront these rivals head-on.

keep reading.

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Judge and Banker—Valuation Analyses in the Delaware Courts

By William A. Groll and David Leinwand.
PDF

116 Penn St. L. Rev. 957.

Litigation challenging public company merger and acquisition transactions is on the increase. Whereas, not too long ago, only transactions involving director conflicts of interest or other potentially troubling facts would bring forth the plaintiffs’ lawyers, today, lawsuits can be expected challenging even those transactions in which a board of directors has, by all readily apparent views, pursued a reasonable process in fulfillment of its fiduciary duties, garnering a significant premium for its shareholders. In such merger and acquisition litigation, the financial advisor to the board of directors often finds itself in the center of the lawyers’ fray with its valuation analyses a crucial factor in the case. Senior bankers are in depositions and before judges more often than in the past, and now, more than ever, financial advisors should expect their analyses to be subject to close scrutiny in the course of deal litigation.

Recent cases decided in the state courts of Delaware, where most merger and acquisition litigation historically has been brought, provide useful guidance for lawyers who counsel financial advisors as well as those who advise principals to transactions regarding how to mitigate litigation risk arising out of a financial advisor’s opinion and analyses. The cases helpful to practitioners can be divided roughly into two groups—appraisal/entire fairness cases and disclosure cases.

The appraisal and entire fairness cases provide guidance regarding the substance and application of valuation analyses. In a typical appraisal action, for instance, the court must determine the “fair value” of the shares at issue, and such determination usually is based on a review of competing valuation analyses submitted by the parties. Similarly, the entire fairness standard, which is applied to certain conflict of interest transactions, requires the court to determine whether an “entirely fair price” was paid to shareholders. In the course of such determination, the court often will closely scrutinize the valuation work performed by the financial advisor for the subject company’s board of directors.

keep reading.

{ Comments on this entry are closed }

Asset Acquisitions: Assuming and Avoiding Liabilities

By Byron F. Egan.
PDF

116 Penn St. L. Rev. 913.

Buying or selling a closely held business, including the purchase of a division or a subsidiary, can be structured as (i) a statutory combination such as a statutory merger or share exchange, (ii) a negotiated purchase of outstanding stock from existing shareholders, or (iii) a purchase of assets from the business. The transaction typically revolves around an agreement between the buyer and the selling entity, and sometimes its owners, setting forth the terms of the deal.

Purchases of assets are characterized by the acquisition by the buyer of specified assets from an entity, which may or may not represent all or substantially all of its assets, and the assumption by the buyer of specified liabilities of the seller, which typically do not represent all of the liabilities of the seller. When the parties choose to structure an acquisition as an asset purchase, there are unique drafting and negotiating issues regarding the specification of which assets and liabilities are transferred to the buyer, as well as the representations, closing conditions, indemnification, and other provisions essential to memorializing the bargain reached by the parties. There are also statutory (e.g., bulk sales and fraudulent transfer statutes) and common law issues (e.g., de facto merger and other successor liability theories) unique to asset purchase transactions that could result in an asset purchaser being held liable for liabilities of the seller which it did not agree to assume.

keep reading.

{ Comments on this entry are closed }