By: Zachary J. Krislov*
Abstract
Reversing historical trends, 2020 congressional redistricting produced national partisan parity. However, as this Article argues, all is not well with our congressional districts. With partisan gerrymandering now a bipartisan affair, electoral competition has diminished. Federal redistricting reform efforts have stalled. The Supreme Court declared partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable. And future redistricting cycles or state-law litigation could re-bias the national House map.
This Article analyzes the pitfalls of recent political and legal developments in redistricting and proposes a solution: interstate redistricting agreements. Through interstate redistricting agreements, sets of states with offsetting partisan gerrymanders could agree to standardize redistricting in procedure, substance, or both. These agreements could deescalate “redistricting warfare,” bolster electoral competition, and increase state legislators’ own electoral opportunities without ceding partisan advantage. This Article addresses policy design questions and interstate redistricting agreements’ constitutionality under the Compact Clause.
* Legal Fellow, Senator Richard Blumenthal, Senate Judiciary Committee. Thank you to Doug Spencer for generously supervising the first version of this Article and to Heather Gerken, Derek Muller, Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Elle Eshleman, Valentina Guerrero, Marvin Krislov, Jake Mazeitis, Saylor Soinski, and my grandmother, Irma Sheon, for feedback that improved this work and conversations that made it more fun to write. I am also grateful to Mark Batinick, David Imamura, David Pepper, Jamie Raskin, and Kirill Reznick for sharing their perspectives on redistricting as political practitioners. Finally, thanks to the editors of the Penn State Law Review for their thoughtful comments and indefatigable editing. The views expressed in this Article are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Senator Blumenthal or the Senate Judiciary Committee.