By: Colin L. Hitt*
Abstract
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is a major federal gun control law that prohibits certain groups of people from owning guns. Among the law’s provisions, § 922(g)(1) prohibits felons from owning guns, and § 922(g)(4) prohibits people who have been involuntarily committed to mental institutions from owning guns. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, federal courts have divided over the constitutionality of various § 922(g) provisions. Decided in 2022, Bruen read the Second Amendment to require that modern gun laws comport with historical firearm restrictions.
In Range v. Attorney General, the Third Circuit applied Bruen to strike down § 922(g)(1) as applied to a nonviolent welfare fraudster. While a narrow decision by some accounts, Range I provoked criticism from dissenting judges for its restrictive application of Second Amendment jurisprudence. And though the Supreme Court remanded Range I following the Court’s decision in United States v. Rahimi, Range II reaffirmed Range I’s holding on nearly identical grounds. Taken together, Bruend and Range II invite consideration of the historical basis for, and constitutionality of, § 922(g)(4).
This Comment asserts that, under Range II, § 922(g)(4) could be unconstitutional as applied to many people who have been involuntarily committed. However, this result contradicts Bruen. To resolve that discrepancy, future cases should focus on dangerousness—what Judge Stephanos Bibas termed “the Second Amendment’s touchstone”—to determine who may be disarmed. In accordance with Bruen, a dangerousness standard reflects historical tradition, maintains the presumptive lawfulness of gun bans for the mentally ill, and avoids a regulatory straightjacket. The robust historical tradition of disarming dangerous people affirms the constitutionality of § 922(g)(4).
* J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University School of Law, 2025.