By: Angela Osimen
I. INTRODUCTION
When adjudicating over whether to enjoin government action due to alleged constitutional violations, federal courts have consistently practiced restraint.[1] Under the federal approach, government actors’ violations of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights will often go without effective remedy due to court concerns over federalism, separation of powers, and certain justiciability standards.[2] However, in recent years, state courts have started to diverge from this cautious approach, particularly in cases involving state constitutions.[3] Rather than treating court injunctions as extraordinary remedies that require heightened proof, some state courts have begun to view constitutional violations as unequivocal harms deserving of judicial action.[4] This view reflects a shift away from strict adherence to institutional deference when deciding state constitutional violation cases.[5]
II. BACKGROUND
The federal model of injunctive restraint was first established in Rizzo v. Goode, where the Supreme Court overturned an injunction meant to reform the Philadelphia police department after numerous complaints of rampant police brutality against Black and Brown communities.[6] In Rizzo, the Court’s holding, based on principles of federalism and separation of powers, was that state institutions deserved the “widest latitude in the dispatch of their own internal affairs.”[7] By removing their own judicial judgment for legislative or executive policy reforms, the Court reasoned that this approach reduced the risk of pulling courts into unnecessary administrative supervision that was traditionally reserved for other government branches.[8] The Supreme Court’s cautious use of judicial judgement was further exemplified in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, where the Court raised the threshold for injunctive relief through standing and irreparable harm requirements.[9] In Lyons, the Court held that although the plaintiff had been subjected to an unconstitutional chokehold, because he could not prove that he would be subjected to the same type of harm again, he lacked standing to seek injunctive relief.[10] By requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a concrete, imminent threat of future harm before a court could intervene and by disregarding past constitutional injury, Lyons created yet another barrier to remedies for constitutional violations.[11] By deferring to government officials, imposing strict standing and imminence requirements, and requiring plaintiffs to prove future irreparable harm, Rizzo and Lyons exemplify how the Supreme Court significantly constrained access to plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief.[12] While the purpose of restraint is to prevent judicial overreach, even when a constitutional violation is recognized and a remedy is warranted, this approach often leaves plaintiffs without recourse to meaningful relief.
Since state courts operate within their own state constitutions that are separate and independent sources of rights, these courts are not bound to the federal remedial doctrines formed in Rizzo and Lyons.[13] Rather than approaching injunctive relief with the same cautious restraint as federal courts, state courts have increasingly adopted different approaches, creating a spectrum with judicial restraint on one end and rights-first approaches on the other.
III. ANALYSIS
Montana serves as a clear example of the rights-first approach to injunctive relief, as the state’s Supreme Court, in Cross v. State, upheld a preliminary injunction that blocked a statewide ban on gender-affirming care.[14] The court found that violating state constitutional rights causes serious harm per se and did not require the plaintiffs to prove further injury beyond the alleged constitutional violation, nor did it accept legislative claims about policy necessity.[15] Instead, the court stressed that it is the judiciary’s job to protect constitutional rights when they are at risk of being violated.[16] The court used the same reasoning in Planned Parenthood of Montana v. State, when they blocked Medicaid abortion restrictions based on the state constitution’s privacy protections, treating the particular constitutional violation as enough to justify issuing an injunction.[17] In both cases, Montana moved away from the federal approach of judicial restraint as the state court viewed judicial intervention not as an improper “management” of state policy but as an essential judicial role when constitutional rights are involved.[18]
However, not all states have deviated from the federal standard of judicial restraint to the same degree as Montana, instead adopting more moderate approaches that combine elements of both models. Colorado adopted a more cautious approach as the state’s Supreme Court found in Markwell v. Cooke that the state legislature had violated constitutional procedural rules but limited the remedy to a declaratory judgment.[19] Despite recognizing there was a constitutional violation, the court chose to not issue an injunction, citing separation of power concerns, similar to what the Court stated in Rizzo.[20] Colorado thus acknowledged the constitutional violations in Markwell while exercising restraint in the subsequent remedy, offering a more moderate stance compared to Montana’s willingness to intervene.[21] However, the Colorado Supreme Court still diverged from the federal standards by recognizing injury without implementing barriers like those seen in Lyons.[22] New York’s approach in Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc v. State of New York more closely resembles the federal model, as the state’s Court of Appeals found that the state violated the constitutional right to basic education but left it to the legislature to create and implement an appropriate remedy.[23] While the court-maintained oversight, it avoided imposing an injunctive reform, mirroring the Rizzo Court’s reluctance to issue injunctions due to concerns over judicial policy.[24]
The difference in approach between the state courts and federal courts reveals that adopting a rights-focused remedial approach may better ensure that victims of constitutional violations actually receive some form of injunctive relief. When courts view constitutional violations as inherently irreparable, as the Montana Supreme Court has, injunctive relief serves as a way to give rights immediate and meaningful effect rather than delaying enforcement until after the legislature decides to step in.[25] This approach does not require courts to abandon all restraint but reflects a shift that instead prioritizes constitutional enforcement within traditional equitable frameworks.[26] Unlike the increasingly limited availability of injunctive relief in federal courts, because state courts operate under independent constitutions, they may be better positioned to serve as effective protectors of constitutional rights.[27]
IV. CONCLUSION
These cases show that the differences between federal and state courts goes beyond just recognizing when fundamental rights have been violated, highlighting the differing philosophies on how to best remedy these violations. On one end of the spectrum, there are states like Montana that view constitutional violations as inherently harmful thus justifying immediate injunctive relief.[28] Moving along that same spectrum, there are states like Colorado, that recognize constitutional injuries while maintaining restraint in judicial intervention, and New York, that enforce rights but defer implementation of potential reform to other government branches.[29] This spectrum reflects the differing views present regarding when courts should intervene and what role equity should play in enforcing constitutional rights. As federal courts continue to limit avenues to injunctive relief, state courts are stepping in to fill the gaps as alternative venues to accessible constitutional remedies.[30] By treating constitutional rights as self-executing and deserving of immediate protection, some state courts are redefining the judiciary’s role in protecting individual’s rights.[31] In a time of limited federal injunctive power, state courts might become the main protectors of constitutional rights, not by completely avoiding restraint, but instead by recalibrating the balance between deference and enforcement.
[1] See Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 530, 577-580 (2016).
[2] See id. at 578.
[3] See G. Alan Tarr, The Past and Future of the New Judicial Federalism, 24 Publius: The Journal Of Federalism 63, 64-65 (1994).
[4] See id. at 66.
[5] See id.
[6] See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 367-370 (1976).
[7] Id. at 378.
[8] See id. at 380.
[9] See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983).
[10] See id. at 105-108.
[11] See id.
[12] See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 368; Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111 (exemplifying constraints on injunctive relief).
[13] See Laura Deal & Joanna R Lampe, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R47641, Federal and State Courts: Structure and Interaction 2-3 (2023).
[14] See Cross v. State, 560 P.3d 637, 656 (Mont. 2024).
[15] See id. at 645.
[16] See id. at 653.
[17] See Planned Parenthood of Montana v. State, 557 P.3d 440, 460-461 (Mont. 2024).
[18] Cross, 560 P.3d at 655; Planned Parenthood of Montana, 557 P.3d at 461 (discussing judicial intervention as an essential role of the court when constitutional rights are involved).
[19] See Markwell v. Cooke, 482 P.3d 422, 430-431 (Colo. 2021).
[20] See id. at 426.
[21] See id.
[22] See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 106 (1983).
[23] See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York, 861 N.E.2d 50, 58-59 (N.Y. 2006).
[24] See id. at 58.
[25] See James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power, 91 Geo. L.J. 1003, 1033 (2003).
[26] See id. at 1058.
[27] See G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1097, 1118 (1997).
[28] See Cross v. State, 560 P.3d 637, 653 (Mont. 2024); Planned Parenthood of Montana v. State, 557 P.3d 440, 460-461 (Mont. 2024).
[29] See Markwell v. Cooke, 482 P.3d 422, 426 (Colo. 2021); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 861 N.E.2d at 58.
[30] See Gardner, supra note 25, at 1030-1032 (2003).
[31] See id. at 1033.
About the Author:
Angela Osimen is a third-year J.D. candidate at Penn State Dickinson Law. She is originally from Odessa, Florida, and graduated magna cum laude from Florida State University with a Bachelor of Arts and Sciences in Political Science and a minor in English. Angela has gained practical legal experience in government, regulatory, and judicial settings while attending Dickinson Law where she has explored her passion for advocating for communities that are often overlooked in the legal system. In her current role as a Certified Legal Intern with the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General’s Civil Litigation Division, Angela is developing litigation skills while working on matters involving public service and institutional accountability.
Suggested Citation: Angela Osimen, The Widest Latitude or the Broadest Remedy? Comparing Federal and State Approaches to Injunctive Relief for Constitutional Violations, Penn St. L. Rev.: F. Blog (Feb. 9, 2026), https://www.pennstatelawreview.org/the-forum/the-widest-latitude-or-the-broadest-remedy-comparing-federal-and-state-approaches-to-injunctive-relief-for-constitutional-violations/