The Vexing Case of Venue for Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering

Melvin L. Otey*

Abstract

The right of accused persons to have their guilt adjudicated in the locations where their alleged crimes occurred is intrinsic to American conceptions of ordered liberty and fundamental fairness. It is so important that it is codified in, among other places, two constitutional provisions. Yet, dramatic technological advances have made affixing venue for some modern crimes increasingly difficult. Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1959, which proscribes violent crimes in aid of racketeering, exemplify the complexity. Courts have used different methods to venue these prosecutions, but the approaches are largely inconsistent with traditional venue determinations, potentially impinge on defendants’ constitutional rights, and easily burden defendants’ vital interests. Consequently, a new approach is sorely needed. This Article proposes a standard that respects both the need for effective prosecution of violent crimes in aid of racketeering and defendants’ compelling interests in answering charges only where alleged offenses occur.

* Associate Professor of Law, Jones School of Law, Faulkner University; B.S.B.A. 1997, St. Louis University. Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, 2000–2003. Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Organized Crime and Gang Section, 2007–2014. E-mail: MOtey@faulkner.edu. The Author expresses his gratitude to colleagues with the John Mercer Langston Writing Workshop for their helpful input during the developmental stages of this Article; Professor Sheldon A. Evans and David J. Stander, Esq. for their constructive critiques as it neared completion; Gigi Panagotacos, Assistant Director for Collection Development and Research Librarian, and Jacob Jackson for their excellent research assistance; and, as always, his wife, Jania, and his sons, Caleb and Christian, for their continuing love and support.

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