By: Mia Jordan
I. INTRODUCTION
Self-defense in the United States is a common law principle.[1] The narrative surrounding self-defense can be illustrated in various ways, but, as time has changed, racial disparities have infiltrated the common law doctrine of self-defense. In 1986, a man, Goetz, entered the New York public subway and was approached by a Black male teenager.[2] The teenager demanded five dollars from Goetz, and, in return, the older man shot the teenager and three of his friends.[3] Goetz pleaded he felt a “reasonable” threat of death or serious bodily injury and needed to open fire on the teenage boys to save himself.[4] Ultimately, New York’s highest court deemed that the approach to a valid self-defense claim is neither wholly objective nor subjective.[5] The court found that “the jury must consider [all] the circumstances [the] defendant [was] in” and whether a reasonable person would have the same necessity to use deadly force as Goetz did.[6] Goetz was acquitted of attempted murder, with a jury determining that Goetz reasonably stood his ground against the teenage boys.[7] Later, polling data showed that 23% of Black New York residents and 50% of White New York residents would have felt the same reasonable necessity for self-defense as Goetz.[8]
II. BACKGROUND
Stand Your Ground (“SYG”) laws have origins dating back to early common law self-defense within the castle doctrine.[9] The castle doctrine concludes a person does not have a duty to retreat in their home before resorting to deadly force against an aggressor.[10] The duty to retreat has been expanded in some states to include one’s workplace and vehicle, while it has been dismantled entirely in others.[11] In 2005, Florida was the first state to vastly expand the net of self-defense by requiring no duty to retreat from a deadly aggressor in any place a person has a legal right to be, rendering the castle doctrine obsolete.[12] The Florida creation allows for “meet[ing] force with force, including deadly force.”[13] By 2021, thirty-one states had followed suit in various implementations of their own SYG laws, with Florida being the most expansive and New York among the most stringent.[14]
While Florida took an expansive approach and eliminated the common law duty to retreat, New York was one of nineteen states that did not adjust its self-defense to encapsulate the SYG laws.[15] The key contrasts between these two states are not the SYG laws themselves. The duty to retreat versus an attempt to stand one’s ground against an aggressor is a difference in self-defense allowance. Florida law allows citizens to protect themselves at any time against imminent death or serious bodily harm, whereas New York requires a retreat to safety, if available, before resorting to such force.[16] Yet, the key separation comes after the incident, where the law is deployed, and the defendant’s day in court has come. A jury must now consider whether the defendant’s decision to stand their ground was reasonable. However, the reasonableness of the approach, as stated by New York’s highest court, is neither wholly objective nor subjective.[17] When a jury of one’s peers is deciding the reasonableness of a defendant standing their ground, implicit bias can change the outcome of that defendant’s verdict.[18]
III. ANALYSIS
The pattern jury instructions for Florida and New York are a model given to help judges decide how to instruct the jury.[19] Each jury instruction given can be unique, but for the purposes of this article, the pattern jury instructions will be considered standard. Florida’s pattern jury instructions ask the jury to “consider the circumstances” around the time and space the force was used.[20] These instructions focus on the defendant and state that “the danger need not be[] actual” but the “appearance of imminent danger must have [made] the defendant [] believe[] the [use] of deadly force was necessary.”[21] The final clause in the Florida jury instructions focuses on the reasonable person.[22] This reasonable person under the same circumstances would have believed the same as the defendant if placed in a similar situation.[23]
In contrast, the New York pattern jury instructions focus on the reasonableness of the belief of the defendant throughout.[24] This belief, “no matter how genuine or sincere, may yet be unreasonable.”[25] The defendant here must have honestly believed that there was a genuine imminent threat necessitating the use of deadly force, and this belief must have been one that a reasonable person with the same knowledge and under the same circumstances would have had.[26]
The separation between these instructions is distinctly due to SYG laws. In stripping away, the common law duty to retreat, the honesty of the belief was reduced, allowing for implicit bias.[27] New York’s instructions focus on the key phrase that an honest belief can still be unreasonable, which narrows the possibility of racial bias negatively affecting the outcome in cases like People v. Goetz.[28] For example, a belief rooted in racial bias that a Black male teenager is more dangerous can be an honest belief. However, this belief is an unreasonable one. The polling data after Goetz’s trial indicated that nearly 80% of the Black New York residents polled, and half of the White New York residents polled did not see a reasonable necessity for self-defense in Goetz’s case.[29] This data[30] suggests that a reasonable person with the same knowledge and under the same circumstances as Goetz would likely have a difficult time recognizing Goetz’s action as reasonable. But, as seen with his acquittal, these instructions allow for some disparity.[31] This can be more easily reconciled in New York than in Florida.
In Florida, the introduction of the instruction of an “appearance” of danger can be misconstrued by a jury to disparage a defendant or victim based upon the race of whom the force was used upon.[32] These instructions showcase that a reasonable belief is more subjective, therefore allowing the defendant’s reasonable belief to stem from their surroundings, their past, and the circumstances therein.[33] This is a promising instruction, given that it allows the jury to empathetically consider the defendant. However, this empathy fails when the defendant or jury has unconscious biases that cannot be cast aside for judgement.[34] Juries bring outside knowledge and experience inside the courtroom, as do defendants. Therefore, it is not enough that an instruction ambiguously labels a reasonable person as one who would act reasonably in the circumstances.[35] It must be understood that not all beliefs, while honest, are reasonable. Additionally, the jury instructions in both Florida and New York may not be able to fully weed out certain biases and racial disparities of a jury.
IV. CONCLUSION
The solution is not necessarily within the black letter of the SYG laws. Over half of the U.S. has adopted a variation of these laws and done away with a duty to retreat, while a minority of states maintain the common law rule.[36] Yet, the common law rule within this minority of states seems to have a positive effect on the jury instructions given when determining the necessity of the use of deadly force.[37] The jury instructions modeling traditional common law allow the jury to demonstrate adequate empathy for the defendant and the victim without cloaking a bias of their own or the bias of the defendant.[38] However, all jury instructions should provide more clarity about the reasonableness standard and ensure that jurors’ implicit biases stay separated from determining the necessity of reasonable force.[39]
[1] See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 48 (N.Y. 1986).
[2] See id. at 43-44.
[3] See id.
[4] Id.
[5] See id. at 50-51.
[6] Id. at 52.
[7] See Dengrove Collection Writeup, Subway Vigilante Bernard Goetz: Self-Defense on Trial, UVA Law: Special Collections, https://perma.cc/5JKQ-YE2H (last visited Mar. 29, 2026).
[8] Maureen Dowd, Fear of Crime Seems to Strain Race Relations, N.Y. Times (May 16, 1985), https://perma.cc/SWJ6-A3F4.
[9] See National Conference of State Legislatures, Self-Defense and ‘Stand Your Ground’ (Sept. 23, 2025), https://perma.cc/6KTU-K3YQ.
[10] See id.
[11] See id.
[12] See id.
[13] Pages v. Seliman-Tapia, 134 So. 3d 536, 539 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
[14] See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 9; see generally People v. Sanchez, 96 N.E.3d 762 (N.Y. 2018).
[15] See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 9.
[16] See N.Y. CLS Penal § 35.15(2)(a) (2026).
[17] See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 50-51 (N.Y. 1986).
[18] Carol M. Bast, Lawyers Should Use Plain Language, 69 Fla. Bar J. 30, 32 (2019).
[19] See N.Y. CLS Penal § 35.15(2) (2026); 1 Fla. Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases 3.6(f) (2026).
[20] 1 Fla. Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases 3.6(f) (2026).
[21] Id.
[22] See id.
[23] See id.
[24] See N.Y. CLS Penal 35.15(2) (2026).
[25] People v. Delisme, 208 A.D.3d 1063, 1070 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022); see generally NY CLS Penal § 35.15 (2026).
[26] See generally NY CLS Penal § 35.15 (2026).
[27] See Mark W. Bennett, Introduction To Implicit (Unconscious) Bias, 89 The Advocate 35, 36 (2019).
[28] See id.; People v. Delisme, 208 A.D.3d 1063, 1070 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022); see generally NY CLS Penal § 35.15
[29] See Dowd, supra note 8.
[30] See id.
[31] See Dengrove Collection Writeup, supra note 7.
[32] 1 Fla. Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases 3.6(f) (2026); see Bast, supra note 18, at 37.
[33] See 1 Fla. Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases 3.6(f) (2026).
[34] See Bennett, supra note 27, at 35, 37.
[35] See id. at 36.
[36] See supra Part II.
[37] See supra Parts II and III.
[38] See supra Part III.
[39] See supra Part III.
About the Author:
Mia Jordan is a first-year J.D. candidate at Penn State Dickinson Law, University Park. Originally from Johnstown, Pennsylvania, Mia graduated as the ROTC student marshal from Penn State University with a Bachelor of Science in Economics. Before enrolling at Penn State Dickinson Law, Mia worked as a legal intern for the Honorable Tamara Bernstein, currently seated in the Cambria County Court of Common Pleas. Mia currently serves as an officer in the U.S. Army Reserve and intends to use her degree in the Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps and pursue children’s advocacy and family law.
Suggested Citation: Mia Jordan, Stand Your Ground Laws and the Reasonable Person Standard: Do Jury Instructions Perpetuate Racial Bias?, Penn St. L. Rev.: F. Blog (Apr. 13, 2026), https://www.pennstatelawreview.org/the-forum/stand-your-ground-laws-and-the-reasonable-person-standard-do-jury-instructions-perpetuate-racial-bias/.